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    This paper investigates the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that 
when corporate boards are more independent, both price and non-price loan terms (e.g., interest 
rates, collateral, covenants and performance pricing) are more favorable and syndicated loans 
comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, board diversity, audit committee structure and 
other director characteristics also influence bank loan price. However they do not consistently 
affect all non-price loan terms except for audit committee independence. Moreover, the impact of 
board independence on bank loans varies with borrower characteristics (e.g., leverage, tangibility 
and anti-takeover environments) and loan characteristics (e.g., loan types and loan structures). 
Overall, our study provides strong evidence that banks tend to recognize the benefits of board 
monitoring in mitigating agency risk and information risk, and reward borrowers with higher 
quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial contracting is “the theory of what kinds of deals are made between financiers and those 
who need financing” (Hart (2001)). A number of theoretical papers study the determinants of debt 
contracting based on an incomplete contracts approach. A general implication of these theoretical 
models is that when information asymmetry and agency costs are severe in a firm, debt holders 
are  more likely to use higher debt  price  and more stringent non-price  terms,  such as more 
covenant restrictions and more collateral requirements, to compensate for higher default risk, 
facilitate monitoring the borrower and limit potential losses (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Boot 
et al. (1991), Stulz and Johnson (1985), Chan and Thakor (1987), Diamond (1993), and Rajan and 
Winton (1995)). Despite the large volume of theoretical work, empirical evidence in this area is 
limited. 
In this paper, we extend this line of research by examining whether the quality of corporate 
boards impacts debt contracting in the context of bank loans. Our results that banks take into 
consideration  the quality of corporate boards when designing bank loan contracts  provide 
empirical evidence to support those theoretical arguments in the debt contracting literature. Our 
results also support the traditional notion in the corporate governance literature that boards of 
directors are important internal corporate governance mechanisms to control agency problems 
and mitigate information risk between the firm and outside stakeholders (e.g., Fama and Jensen 
(1983)).  
We focus on bank loan contracting for two primary reasons. First, Bank loans are one of the 
most important sources of corporate financing, not only for small firms, but also for large public 
companies (e.g., Chava et al. (2009) and Graham et al. (2008)). The sheer volume of bank loan 2 
 
financing is larger than equity and bond financing. 
1
Second, and more important, our paper is motivated by the significant differences between the 
public and private debt. Prior studies by Bhoraj and Sengupta (2003) and Anderson et al. (2004) 
on boards of directors and cost of debt focus on the ex-post bond yield alone. Unlike bondholders 
who lack monitoring incentives due to wide dispersions of ownership and resulting free rider 
problems, banks are special not only because they have access to proprietary information and can 
provide effective monitoring (see, e.g., Fama (1985) and Diamond (1984)), but also because it is 
easier for them to renegotiate contract terms ex-post or exercise control rights in the event of 
default (Rajan (1992)). Therefore, banks are more likely to design customized contracts with both 
price and non-price terms and with in-depth knowledge of their borrowers generated from their 
lending relationships (Bharath et al. (2008)).
 Given the significance of bank loans, it is 
important to investigate whether corporate boards impact private bank debt.  
2
In this study, we focus on at-issuance four important loan contract terms, including interest 
rates, collateral, covenants and performance pricing, and test how these loan terms are affected by 
different characteristics of boards of directors. Although we cannot consider every aspect of bank 
loan contracts, our multidimensional approach allows us to more comprehensively and precisely 
estimate how corporate boards affect bank loan contracts. In addition, loan contracts also allow us 
to uniquely analyze the impact of corporate boards on the structure of bank loans, such as the 
number of lenders in a syndicated loan. 
 As bank loan contracts reflect expert assessments of 
borrower’s financial risk characteristics, they are more informative than public bonds. 
Using a sample of 9,621 loans issued to the S&P 1,500 public companies between 1996 and 
2006, we estimate different reduced-form OLS regressions and logistic regressions to explain 
                                                 
1 For example, according to the Loan Pricing Association and Federal Reserve System, in 2005 the total 
amount of equity issuance was about 115 billion, and the total amount of corporate bond issuance was 
about 700 billion while the total amount of bank loan issuance was 1,500 billion. 
2 Bharath et al. (2008) find banks set both higher interest rates and tighter non-price loan terms for poorer 
accounting quality borrowers, while bondholders only react to accounting quality of borrowers in price 
term, but not non-price terms. 3 
 
loan contract terms conditional on a range of different board characteristics. Following previous 
studies, we control for firm characteristics and loan characteristics that are likely to shape loan 
contract terms. 
We draw three broad conclusions from our findings. First, when corporate boards are more 
independent, lenders provide credits at lower interest rates and more favorable non-price terms, 
such as less collateral requirements, less covenant restrictions and less performance pricing 
provisions. In addition, more lenders participate in syndicated loans when borrowers have more 
independent boards. The  results show that banks view board independence as an important 
element in determining bank loan contracts. They also imply that board independence is one of 
the important indicators of the quality of boards in strengthening  corporate governance, and 
support the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the NYSE and NASDAQ new listing rules 
with regard to board independence requirements.
3
Second, we find many other board characteristics also affect bank loan price. For example, 
board size, audit committee structure (including audit committee independence, size and financial 
experts on the audit committee), board diversity, and director tenure are significantly negatively 
related to bank loan price, while director age, director shareholdings, and block holders on boards 
are significantly positively related to bank loan price. When we examine the effects of those 
board characteristics on non-price loan terms, we find most of them do not consistently affect the 
likelihood of using all non-price terms considered here, except for audit committee independence. 
This result further demonstrates the importance of independence in determining board committee 
quality, and supports SOX and new listing requirements regarding full independence of board 
committees. 
  
                                                 
3 SOX does not specifically require boards to have majority outside board members. However, it does 
mandate that the audit, compensation and nominating committees be composed entirely of outside directors. 
Both the NYSE and NASDAQ new listing rules pursuant to SOX require firms to have majority outside 
boards. 4 
 
Third, the effect of corporate boards on bank loans varies with different borrower and loan 
characteristics. Specifically, we find the influence of board independence on bank loan price is 
more pronounced for borrowers with higher leverage levels, lower tangibility levels or higher 
antitakeover provisions (ATPs)  scores than for borrowers with lower leverage  levels, higher 
tangibility  levels  or  lower  ATPs  scores. Likewise,  the  board independence effect  is  more 
pronounced for line of credits or syndicated loans compared to term loans or sole loans. Taken 
together, the impact of corporate boards on bank loan price is more critical when dealing with 
higher risk borrowers and higher risk loans. 
As board structure is endogenously determined, empirical work on corporate boards always 
faces the endogeneity problem (Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)). In our study, although the 
feedback mechanism from bank loan terms on board structure is less likely, it is still possible that 
any omitted variable correlated both with firm-level risk factors and with the board structure 
would bias our estimates in the single equations. Fortunately, the passage of SOX and the NYSE 
and NASDAQ new listing rules pursuant to SOX, which is an exogenous shock to board structure, 
provides us an excellent natural experiment to mitigate the potential endogeneity concern. 
We find that bank loan spread is about 28 basis points lower for the post-SOX period than for 
the pre-SOX period in our sample, and the deduction of bank loan price in SOX era is mainly 
effective for small firms but not for large firms. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we 
also find that firms who comply with the board structure requirement from insider-dominated 
boards before SOX to outsider-dominated boards after SOX have significant deductions in bank 
loan price compared to other unaffected firms. Our results indicate that banks do appreciate the 
overall effect of SOX in strengthening corporate governance and grant borrowers with lower 
bank loan price in the post-SOX era. Small firms, which exhibit more substantial improvements 
in their governance system after SOX (Linck et al. (2008)), obtain more benefits in the loan 
market. Further, the result of difference-in-difference analysis alleviates endogeneity concern of 5 
 
our study, and suggests that board independence brings about, and not merely reflects, a reduced 
bank loan price. 
Melnik and Plaut (1986) point out that debt contracts consist of multiple terms which cannot 
be treated separately. Dennis et al. (2000) find the interdependences among different loan 
contract terms empirically. To address the issue of joint determinations of different loan terms, 
we employ a simultaneous equation model, explicitly testing the interrelations among price and 
non-price loan terms. Our results show that certain loan contract terms are interrelated, and 
corporate boards continuously affect bank loan contracts in the simultaneous equation model.  
Our paper contributes to both bank loan contracting and board of director literatures in several 
important ways. First, our study adds to the emerging research on the determinants of bank loan 
contracting (e.g., Strahan (1999), Benmelech et al. (2005), Qian and Strahan (2007) and Bharath 
et al. (2008)). In three surveys conducted by McKinsey & Co. in 1999 and 2000, the majority of 
banks explicitly exhibit their concerns about the board practice when they evaluate credit quality 
of borrowers  for investments (Coombes and Watson (2000)). Our paper is the first one that 
provides empirical evidence to show that banks take into consideration the quality of corporate 
boards when designing bank loan contracts. 
Second, prior studies by Bhoraj and Sengupta (2003) and Anderson et al. (2004) on boards of 
directors and cost of debt only focus on the price term of debt. As we know, debt contracts have 
multiple terms and they cannot be treated separately (Melnik and Plaut (1986)). In addition, 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out that while interest rates are an effective way to “price” the 
risk of debt, they have adverse effects on the moral hazard problem of borrowers. Therefore it is 
important to focus on both price and non-price terms in studying debt contracts (Qian and Strahan 
(2007)). Further, beyond debt price, the non-price debt terms are also costly to borrowers. For 
instance, borrowers may have to give up profitable investment opportunities to comply with 
restrictive debt covenants. The multidimensional approach employed in our study allows us to 
more comprehensively examine how various aspects of loan contracts are affected by the quality 6 
 
of corporate boards and allows us to more precisely capture the total costs of debt borne by 
borrowers. 
Third, our study also extends the existing board of director literature. Despite the proliferation 
of studies, there is still much debate on the effectiveness of boards of directors and on how 
different board aspects, especially board independence, impact board efficacy.
4
Fourth, in our research design, we alleviate the endogeneity concern which is faced by most 
empirical work on boards of directors by testing how an exogenous shock to board structure leads 
to a shift of bank loan price. We also use simultaneous equations to address the interdependence 
among different loan contract terms, which is widely ignored by prior studies in bank loan 
contracting literature. 
 In this paper, we 
comprehensively examine the impacts of different features of corporate boards on bank loan 
contracting. Our results suggest that corporate boards play  a significant role in corporate 
governance, and several board characteristics, especially board and audit committee 
independence, are important indicators for the quality of corporate boards, at least from creditors’ 
perspective. The results are consistent with traditional notion (e.g., Fama (1980) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983)) that outside directors are effective monitors. The results also provide evidence to 
support SOX and new listing requirements concerning board and audit committee independence 
in strengthening corporate governance of firms. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review related literature 
and discuss why corporate boards affect bank loan contracting. Section 3 describes our sample 
selection, explain our key board variables,  and presents descriptive statistics. The results of 
univariate tests are reported in Section 4. In Section 5, we report the results of multivariate tests. 
The final section provides conclusions. 
 
 
                                                 
4 For surveys of corporate boards, see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Adams et al. (2008). 7 
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
There is an emerging literature examining the  determinants of bank loan contracting in a 
multivariate setting. For example, Strahan (1999) investigates how borrower characteristics affect 
bank loan contracting. He finds that riskier firms such as smaller firms and higher leveraged firms 
pay higher interest rates when they borrow from bankers. In addition, banks also use non-price 
loan terms, such as more intensive collateral to facilitate monitoring and limit potential losses 
when lending to riskier borrowers. Benmelech et al. (2005) examine the effect of asset liquidation 
value on bank loan contracting. Using a property’s zoning designation as the measure of its 
liquidation value, they find that properties with greater zoning flexibility are financed with lower 
interest rates and longer maturity loans. Bharath et al. (2008) study the effect of accounting 
quality on both public debt and bank loan contracting. They find poorer accounting quality 
borrowers prefer bank loans, because banks have access to private information which reduces 
adverse selection costs of borrowers. In addition, accounting quality affects price and non-price 
terms of bank loans, while it only affects price term of public debt. On the country level, Qian 
and Strahan (2007) test how credit rights influence bank loan contracting. They find loans have 
more concentrated ownership, lower interest rates and longer maturities under strong creditor 
protection environment. 
Traditional banking theory implies that the likelihood of default is one of the primary 
determinants of bank loan terms. Higher default risk leads to higher loan price and tighter non-
price loan terms. Bhoraj and Sengupta (2003) argue that the agency risk and information risk 
between management and outside stakeholders affect the default risk of debt. Theoretical work 
also suggests the effects of asymmetric information and agency costs on the price of debt and on 
the choice of debt contract terms (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Boot et al. (1991) and Rajan 
and Winton (1995)).  Assuming boards of directors play an effective role in monitoring 8 
 
management, they could reduce agency risk and information risk both ex-ante and ex-post. 
5
Furthermore, although banks are delegated monitors and have monitoring ability, the latter is 
different from monitoring incentive (e.g., Besanko and Kanatas (1993) and Carletti (2004)). As 
monitoring is not contractible and is costly, banks choose the monitoring intensities that 
maximize their profits, rather than the financial return of the project (Carletti (2004)). As both 
corporate boards and creditors are corporate governance mechanisms to control agency problems, 
and prior studies find a substitution effect among certain governance mechanisms (e.g., Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996)), if corporate boards fully or partially substitute banks’ monitoring 
responsibilities, banks’ monitoring incentives, which are reflected in both price and non-price 
loan terms, should be affected by the quality of corporate boards. Collectively, if boards of 
directors play an effective role in corporate governance, this would reduce agency risk, 
information risk and thereby banks’ monitoring incentives and costs. Then, we expect that firms 
with higher quality of corporate boards should enjoy more favorable bank loan contract terms. 
 As 
informed lenders with in-depth knowledge of their borrowers, banks should take into account the 
role of boards of directors and lower their required risk premium in bank loan contracts if a firm 
has a higher quality board. 
As we know, corporate boards are supposed to act in the interests of shareholders, and not 
necessarily in the interests of debt holders. Agency theory of debt implies that shareholders have 
incentives to take actions to transfer wealth from debt holders to shareholders (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977)). Therefore, it is possible that boards of directors encourage 
managers in wealth expropriation activities ex-post. However, prior studies find  that wealth 
transfers from debt holders to stockholders do not exist (e.g.,  Marais et al. (1989)), or are 
relatively small (e.g., Asquith and Wizman (1990) and Warga and Welch (1993)). Therefore, we 
expect, for banks, the perceived benefits from reduction in agency and information risk outweigh 
                                                 
5 Anderson et  al. (2004) argue that corporate boards affect the reliability and validity of financial 
accounting process, which in turns impact cost of debt.  9 
 
the potentially negative wealth transfer effects. Furthermore, more recent theoretical work by 
Stecher and Gronnevet (2009) argue that when a corporate board is more independent, the 
decisions of the board are more in line with the interests of creditors than those of shareholders, 
because the information disadvantages of outside board members makes them put more weight on 
the probability of default, but not just the expected payoff of a project. 
Bank loan contracts have multiple terms. Although higher interest rates are an effective way to 
compensate for risk under symmetric information, they have side effects by worsening the moral 
hazard problem of borrowers choosing riskier projects (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Therefore, 
banks are more likely to set up customized contracts not only on price, but also on non-price loan 
terms to price risk, facilitate monitoring and limit potential losses. Empirically, Graham et al. 
(2008) find that when information risk is higher in a firm, a lender is more likely to use both 
higher interest rates and tighter non-price loan terms, such as more collateral requirements, and 
more covenant restrictions. 
In this paper, beyond interest rates, we focus on three important non-price loan terms: 
collateral, covenants and performance pricing. Among them, collateral and covenants are loan 
terms which banks commonly use to control for information risk and agency costs, and they are 
widely discussed and examined in the literature. For example, Berger and Udell (1990) and 
Jimenez et al. (2006) document that lenders are more likely to use collateral when borrowers are 
riskier. Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss how restrictive covenants reduce moral hazard costs. 
Rajan and Winton (1995) discuss how the use of collateral and covenants affect banks’ incentives 
to monitor borrowers. Performance pricing is a relatively new provision in loan contracts. It links 
loan price with the borrowers’ credit rating or financial performance. Asquith et al. (2005) point 
out that performance pricing is an effective tool to control for the uncertainty of borrowers’ 
financial risk and reduce renegotiation costs. Taken  together, we expect a bank gives lower 
interest rates, less likely to use collateral, covenants and performance pricing when lending to a 
firm with a higher quality of corporate board. 10 
 
Syndicate loan literature also  indicates that lenders have less incentives to participate in 
syndicated loans when firms are opaque and the probability of financial distress is high (e.g., 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Dennis and Mullineaux (2000)). Sufi (2007) finds that the 
structure of syndicated loans is more concentrated with fewer lenders when information 
asymmetries are severe, and the credit risk of the borrower is higher. We expect that the effective 
monitoring of corporate boards reduces information asymmetries and agency risk between 
management and outside stakeholders, hence reduces firms’ opaqueness and default risk. 
Consequently, lenders’ incentives to participate in syndicated loans increase.  Therefore, we 
hypothesize more lenders are willing to participate in syndicate loans if borrowers have higher 
quality of corporate boards.  
 
3. Data description and variables  
3.1. Data sources  
Information on corporate boards is obtained from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC). The IRRC board data covers S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 for the 
1996-2006 proxy seasons.
6
Bank loan information is obtained from the LPC Dealscan database, which contains historical 
bank loan data that are compiled from the SEC filings, self-reporting by banks and its staff 
reporters. The database includes detailed deal terms and conditions on loans, such interest rates, 
loan size, 
 maturities, covenants, performance pricing, and collateral. Beyond these loan contract 
terms, Dealscan also includes information on the types of loans and the purposes of loans, as well 
 It provides detail information of each director, such as the director’s 
name, title, affiliation, age, tenure, ethnicity, directorship and shareholdings. Following previous 
studies, we exclude financial companies based on the SIC codes (6000-6999). 
                                                 
6 S&P 1,500 covers about 85% of the US equities market.  11 
 
as the structure of syndicated loans, such as the name of each lead bank and participant banks in a 
syndicated loan. 
7
We also draw firm accounting information from the Compustat database to control for firm 
specific characteristics, the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index (G-index) from IRRC to 
control for ATPs level, and macroeconomic condition information from the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors to control for macroeconomic condition. We merge all data by ticker 
symbols.  Because  ticker symbols  are recycled in practice, we manually checked all of the 





3.2. Measuring the quality of corporate boards 
Unlike many other corporate governance mechanisms, boards of directors have multiple facets. 
It is difficult to quantify the quality of corporate boards. In the traditional board literature, board 
independence is widely used as the most important indicator  for  board quality. Many other 
studies also investigate how board monitoring ability and incentive are affected by other board 
characteristics, such as board size, board duality, audit committee, board diversity, director 
shareholdings, directorships and interlocked directors. In this paper, we comprehensively test how 
different board characteristics impact bank loan contracting. 
Board independence: It has long been recognized that board independence is one of the most 
important determinants of board quality.
9
                                                 
7 In a syndicated loan, a group of lenders make a loan jointly to a single borrower. Typically, one or several 
lead arranger(s) establishes a lending relationship with the borrower, negotiates terms of the contract, and 
guarantees an amount for a price range. The lead arranger(s) then find participant lenders to fund part of the 
loan. In our sample, 88% of loans are syndicated.  
  Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
outside directors have the incentive to act as monitors of management because they want to 
protect their reputations as effective, independent decision makers. Although most empirical 
8 Facility is the fundamental security, which designates a loan in the syndicated loan market. Usually, a 
number of facilities with different interest rates and non-price terms are structured and syndicated as one 
deal with a borrower. 
9 In our paper, we define an independent director as a board member who has not been an employee of the 
firm and who is not affiliated with the firm through business ties or family ties, which is consistent with the 
IRRC definition.  12 
 
studies do not find a significant relation between board independence and firm performance (see, 
e.g., Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)), outside dominated boards 
do affect several firms’ discrete tasks.
  For instance, outside dominated boards are more likely to 
replace CEOs in response to poor performance (Weisbach (1988)) and nominate outside CEOs 
(Huson et al. (2002)), control CEO over-compensation (Core et al. (1999)) and overinvestment in 
firms with positive free cash flows (Richardson (2006)), and oversee financial accounting process 
and reduce earning management and financial frauds (e.g., Beasley (1996) and Klein (2002a)). 
Bhoraj and Sengupta (2003) and Anderson et al. (2004) both find that board independence is 
negatively related to the cost of public debt.  
Board size: The role of size on board effectiveness is ambiguous. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
argue that it is difficult to express all ideas and opinions in the limited time available to boards 
with many members. Jensen (1993) argues that small boards are more effective because of the 
high coordination costs and free rider problems associated with large boards. Several studies, 
such as Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998), detect a negative relation between board size 
and firm performance.  However, Singh and Harianto (1989)  suggest that large boards might 
enhance corporate governance by reducing CEO domination and by providing broader services. 
Klein (2002b) finds that board committee assignments are influenced by board size since large 
boards have more directors to spread around. She suggests that board monitoring is increasing in 
board size due to the ability to distribute the work load over a greater number of observers. 
Recent work by Linck et al. (2008), Boone et al. (2007) and Coles et al. (2008) argue that the 
optimal board size should depend on firm specific traits, such as firm size, age and complexity of 
business. Anderson et al. (2004) find a negative relation between board size and the cost of public 
debt.  
Board duality: Duality refers to a board leadership structure in which the CEO fulfills both the 
function as CEO and chairman of the board of directors.  Dayton (1984) argues that duality 
reduces the possibility that the board of directors can properly execute its monitoring role due to 13 
 
excessive concentration of power in one person’s hands. The board is too influenced by managers, 
which prevents it from effectively monitoring important decisions. This allows the CEO to 
control information available to other board members (Jensen (1993)). Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999) find that duality leads to managers being more entrenched and are more likely to 
manipulate earnings.  In contrast, stewardship theory suggests that unified and responsible 
leadership builds trust and stimulates the CEO’s motivation to perform well (Muth and 
Donaldson, (1998)).  
Audit committee:  Although the board of directors has the responsibility to monitor 
management, the specific task of overseeing financial accounting processes is usually delegated 
to the audit committee. Beasley (1996) and Anderson et al. (2004) argue that the audit committee 
plays an important role in providing credible financial information to firms’ stakeholders. 
Previous studies find that audit committees can effectively carry out their oversight of the 
financial reporting process if audit committees are dominated by outside directors and the size of 
audit committees is large (e.g., Beasley (1996), Klein (2002b) and Anderson, et al. (2004)). Klein 
(1998) finds that when the CEO participates on the audit committee, it is difficult for the latter to 
fulfill its monitoring function well. The SOX also requires that audit committees include at least 
one financial expert. DeFond et al. (2005) find positive market reactions  around the 
announcement of newly appointed audit committee members with a  financial background. 
Anderson et al. (2004) find that audit committee independence and size are significantly 
negatively related, while financial expertise in audit committee is irrelevant to the cost of bonds. 
Board shareholdings: One element that reflects the incentives of directors to actively monitor 
management is board shareholdings.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that director equity-
ownership creates powerful incentives for directors to monitor management. Empirical studies 
support that a positive relation between financial stake of board members and board effectiveness 
(e.g., Shivdasani (1993)). However, higher shares of board members may not be beneficial to 14 
 
debt holders because of the agency cost of debt (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Smith and 
Warner (1979)). 
Block holders on boards: Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that block holders are important to 
a well-functioning governance system because they have the interest and independence to 
monitor management actions. A block holder may nominate a person to represent him or her on 
the board of directors so at to ensure that management is acting in the interests of the block holder. 
Thus, block  holders can provide effective monitoring of management, which benefits other 
stakeholders, too. Alternatively, the private benefit hypothesis by Barclay and Holderness (1989) 
argue that block holders can exercise undue influence over the management to secure benefits 
that are to the detriment of other providers of capital. Skaife  et al. (2005) suggest that the 
presence of block  holders results in greater agency risk between block  holders and other 
stakeholders.  
Board diversity:  Board diversity refers to the presence of women and minorities, such as 
African Americans, Asians and Hispanics, on boards of directors. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
argue that board diversity affects directors’ incentives to work cooperatively, and female directors 
have fewer attendance problems at board meetings, which suggest that diverse boards can be 
more effective than homogeneous boards. Carter et al. (2003) document a positive relation 
between gender and ethnic diversity of the board and corporate performance. They argue that 
diverse boards are more active because the nontraditional characteristics of females and 
minorities can be viewed as ultimate outsiders.  
Number of directorships: Fama and Jensen (1983) and Perry and Peyer (2005) argue that firms 
that seek highly qualified directors might regard multiple appointments on other boards as a 
quality signal. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) and Ferris et al. (2003) find that successful directors 
are also more likely to receive more offers to serve on other boards. In contrast, the “busy” 
hypothesis argues that too many board assignments can disperse board members’ time and 
attention, thereby reducing their ability to monitor management. Core et al. (1999) find that CEO 15 
 
pay is excessive in firms where board members are “busy”, suggesting poor monitoring 
effectiveness with “busy” directors.  
Interlocked directors: Hallock (1997) find that interlocked boards result in higher levels of 
CEO compensation, suggesting that the presence of interlocked directors may compromise the 
effectiveness of board monitoring. Devos et al. (2008) argue that the presence of interlocked 
directors is indicative of weak governance and entrenched managers.  
Director tenure: The expertise hypothesis  suggests that the longer the tenure is, the more 
effective a director is, as long-term engagement provides a director with deep knowledge and 
familiarity about the firm and its business environment. On the other hand, the management 
friendliness hypothesis suggests that seasoned directors are more likely to befriend managers, 
thus leading to a more relaxed monitoring attitude (Vafeas (2003)). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
recognize that lead directors may attempt to usurp some of the CEO's functions through time, and 
therefore advocate term limits for directors.  
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the major board, firm and loan variables. With regard 
to board characteristics, we find that the average board size in our sample is 9.76 with a minimum 
of 3 directors and a maximum of 21 directors. The average number of outside directors is 6.60. 
The outside fraction (composition) is 67% and it varies widely across our sample from 9% to 
100%. In our sample, about 82% firms have dual CEOs. These numbers are similar to those in 
other recent studies. For example, Linck et al. (2008) report for large firms for the period 1990-
2004, the mean board size is 10, the mean outsider fraction is 73% and duality is about 71%. 
Coles et al. (2008) find that, for the period 1992-2001, the mean board size is 10.40 with mean 
outsider fraction of 78%. Anderson et al. (2004) report a mean board of 12.10 with 7 outsiders 
using a sample of S&P 500 firms for the period 1993-1998. In our sample, the average board age 
is 59.14 and the average tenure is 9.16, which are very similar to the findings of Anderson et al. 16 
 
(2004). We also find about 64% firms have at least one woman on the board, and around 54% of 
directors are minorities. On average, each board holds about 9% of total shares of the firm. With 
respect to the audit committee, the average size is 3.24, with outside directors hold 90.79% of 
audit committee seats.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
With regard to borrower characteristics, the average value of assets for our sample borrowers is 
9,516 million, ranging from a minimum of 1.84 million to a maximum of 1,157,248 million. The 
average leverage ratio is 0.29, the average market to book ratio is 1.83, the average tangibility is 
0.65, the average profitability is 1.83 and the average Z-score is 1.78. All of them also vary across 
our sample.  
With regard to loan characteristics, we find that the average loan spread is 120.98 basis points, 
ranging from 5.50 basis points to 1000 basis points. In our sample, the average loan amount is 
493 million with the mean maturity of 43 months. On average, there are around 10 lenders in a 
loan. The loan amount, maturity and number of lenders also vary considerably across our sample. 
We also find that more than 50% of loans use covenants, collateral or performance pricing terms 
in our sample. The results of loan variables are very similar to the findings by Chava et al. (2009), 
which also use the IRRC database and Dealscan database.  
 
4. Results of univariate tests 
To assess the effect of different board characteristics on bank loan terms and structure, we 
partition the full sample into two sub-samples based on three major factors of board structure: 
composition, size and duality. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We first bisect the full sample based on the composition of a board: (1) the dependent board 
sample with outside board members less than 50% of a board; and (2) the independent board 
sample with outside board members more than 50% of a board. Panel A of Table 2 reports 17 
 
descriptive statistics on our major variables separately for these two samples, along with the t-test 
results for the mean differences between the two samples. As shown in Panel A, the mean of loan 
spread is 151.16 basis points for the dependent board sample, while it is 115.40 basis points for 
the independent board sample. The mean difference of 35.76 basis points is significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that banks charge significantly lower loan rates for borrowers with independent 
boards than for borrowers with dependent boards.  
With respect to non-price loan terms, we find that the means of loan collateral, general 
covenants, financial covenants and performance pricing are all significantly different between the 
dependent board sample and the independent board sample at the 1% level. On average, loans for 
borrowers with independent  boards are less likely to be secured and have  less general and 
financial covenants and performance pricing terms. In addition, the independent board sample has 
more lenders in syndicated loans than the dependent board sample. Univariate comparisons seem 
to support our hypothesis  that banks do consider the role of corporate boards  and use more 
favorable loan terms when lending to firms with independent boards.  
While the univariate tests  provide preliminary evidence that borrowers with independent 
boards enjoy more favorable loan contract terms, the results do  not take into  consideration 
potentially fundamental differences in borrower characteristics  between these  two groups. 
Therefore, we also compare the borrower characteristics between sub-samples. We find that the 
average of firm size, leverage, tangibility, profitability and market to book, are all significantly 
different between the dependent and independent board samples. On average, borrowers with 
independent boards are larger, less leveraged, less profitable, have lower market to book ratios 
and more tangible assets, compared to borrowers with dependent boards.  
To assess the effect of board size on bank loan contracting, we further separate the full sample 
into two sub-samples based on the median size of boards: (1) the large board sample with more 
than 9 directors on the board; and (2) the small board sample with less than or equal to 9 directors 
on the board. Panel B of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics separately for the two samples. We 18 
 
find that the average loan spread is 92.96 basis points for the large board sample, while it is 
140.70 basis points for the small board sample. The mean difference of 47.74 basis points is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that banks charge significantly lower loan rates for 
borrowers with large boards than for borrowers with small boards. We also find that loans for 
borrowers with large boards are less likely  to be secured, have less general and financial 
covenants and performance pricing terms compared to borrowers with small boards. All the 
differences between these two samples are significant at the 1% level. The results indicate banks 
seem in favor of large boards. 
In Panel C of Table 2, we segregate the entire sample based on whether the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board. Surprisingly, we find that borrowers with duality boards enjoy lower loan 
spread, and loans are less likely to be secured and have less covenants and performance pricing 
terms than borrowers with non-duality boards. The  results seem not consistent with our 
expectation. 
In sum, the results of univariate tests suggest that banks provide more favorable loan terms to 
borrowers with independent, large and duality boards. The  results also show that some key 
borrower characteristics that may affect bank loans are significantly different across sub-samples. 
In the next section, we conduct multivariate tests. We find that the effect of board duality on most 
of loan contract terms disappears after controlling for borrower and loan specific characteristics.  
 
5. Results of multivariate tests  
In our multivariate regression models, we begin by testing in reduced-form  how different 
board characteristics affect bank loan price, and conduct a series of robustness checks. To address 
endogeneity concern, we examine how an exogenous shock to board structure leads to a change 
of bank loan price. Further, we investigate whether the effect of corporate boards on bank loan 
price varies with borrower and loan characteristics. Next, we examine the effect of corporate 19 
 
boards on non-price loan terms and loan structure. Finally, we employ a simultaneous equation 
model to control for the interdependences among different loan terms.  
 
5.1. Corporate boards and bank loan price 
5.1.1. Board structure and bank loan price 
We first test the effect of board structure including board independence, board size and board 
duality on bank loan price. The empirical model follows: 
Log (Loan spread) =f (Board characteristics, Firm characteristics, Loan characteristics, 
                                     Macroeconomic factors, Industry effects, Year effects)              (1) 
 
In the regression, the basic unit of observations is loan facility, and the dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the loan spread. The coefficient estimates on board characteristics are our 
primary interests.  
Following prior studies, such as Graham et al. (2008) and Qian and Strahan (2007), we control 
for several firm characteristics which may affect loan price in the regressions. We first use the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, Log (assets), to measure firm size. Prior research finds 
that the information asymmetry problem is more severe in small firms. Small firms have more 
difficulties to access external funding compared to large firms. Also the reputations of large firms 
are higher than small firms. Thus, we expect that firm size is negatively associated with bank loan 
price. We use Market to book, which is the market value of equity plus book value of debt 
divided by total assets, to proxy for the growth opportunities of firms. All else equal, a firm with 
better growth opportunities has higher expected cash flow, and thus enjoys lower loan price.  
We also control for Leverage,  which is the long  term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
divided by total assets, Profitability, measured as EBITDA divided by total assets, and Z-score, 
which is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score in the regression. 
10
                                                 
10 Following Graham et al. (2008), we use a modified Z-score, which does not include the ratio of market 
value of equity to book value of total debt, because a similar term, market-to-book, is included in the 
regressions.  
 All of above variables measure a 20 
 
firm’s default risk. All else equal, higher leverage, lower profitability and lower Z-score are 
related to higher default risk. Therefore, we expect that leverage is positively related to bank loan 
price, and profitability and Z-score are negatively related to bank loan price. We also control for 
Tangibility, which is the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Since lenders 
recover exposures particularly through tangible assets in case of default, we expect Tangibility is 
negatively related to loan price. All of the above firm level variables are measured one fiscal year 
prior to the loan initiation year. Further, we employ one digit SIC dummies and year dummies to 
control for the potential differences in loan pricing across industries and years. Klock et al. (2004) 
and Chava et al. (2009) report that ATPs levels affect the cost of debt, thus, we use the G-index to 
proxy for the level of ATPs levels in our regression. 
We further control for loan characteristics which may affect loan contracting in the regression. 
We include Log (facility), the natural logarithm of the amount of a loan facility, to measure loan 
size. Graham et al. (2008)) argue that loan size is inversely related to loan spread, as banks give 
riskier borrowers with smaller loans with higher spread, or because of the economies of scale 
effect in banking relationship. We use Log (maturity), the natural logarithm of loan maturity in 
months, to control for higher repayment risk inherent in longer loan contracts. Sharpe (1990) and 
Rajan (1992) emphasize lock up problems associated with established lender-borrower 
relationship that increase subsequently borrowing costs. To control for previous  lending 
relationship, we construct a variable Prior relations, which is the total number of previous loans 
established by the same borrower and the same lead lender in the Dealscan database. Dealscan 
also contains information on Moody’s and S&P senior debt ratings at the close of the loan. 
Following Qian and Strahan (2007), we construct loan rating score based on Moody’s rating 
unless it is missing, in which case we use S&P rating. Rating is a score that ranges from one to 
six, with one indicating an Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, 
four indicating a Bbb rating, five indicating a Bb rating, and six indicating a B or worse rating.  21 
 
Bank loan terms may be different for different loan types and purposes. Therefore, we also 
control for both loan type effect and loan purpose effect in our analysis. We separate loan types 
into five categories: 364-day facility, Revolver, Term loan, Term loan B-D (Institutional term 
loan), and others. For loan purposes, we separate loans into seven groups: Acquisition lines, 
LBO/MBO, Takeover, Debt Repay/Recapitalization, Corporate Purpose, Working Capital, and 
others.  
Following Graham et al. (2008), we use Credit Spread, which is the difference between the 
yields of BAA and AAA corporate bonds, and Term Spread, which is the difference between the 
yields of 10 year treasury bonds and 2 year treasury bonds, to control for the effects  of 
macroeconomic conditions on the price of bank loans in the regression. Credit spreads tend to 
widen in recessions and to shrink in expansions (Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)), and high term 
spreads are often used as an indicator of good economic prospects (Graham et al. (2008)). Thus, 
we expect Credit Spread is positively and Term Spread is negatively related to bank loan spread.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 provides results from OLS regressions. Across three different measures to proxy for 
board independence, our results indicate consistently that greater board independence is 
associated with lower bank loan price. In Column 1, we use a binary variable Independent board, 
which equals one if the majority of board members are outsiders and zero otherwise, to measure 
board independence. The estimated coefficient is negative and is significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient estimate indicates that bank loan spread is about 11% lower for borrowers with 
outsider-dominated boards than for borrowers with insider-dominated boards. In Column 2, we 
use Composition, the fraction of outside directors in a board, to measure board independence. The 
coefficient estimate of Composition is -0.30 and is significant at the 1% level. Economically, the 
coefficient indicates that 1% increase of board independence reduces bank loan spread about 
0.30%. If a firm moves from a 25
th percentile independent board to a 75
th percentile independent 
board, its bank loan price will reduce about 15.25%. Finally, we use Log (outsider), the natural 22 
 
logarithm of the number of outside directors on the board in Column 3 and find similar results. 
The coefficient estimate indicates that bank loan spread will decrease about 0.20% if we increase 
the  absolute  size of outside  directors  by 1%. Taken  together, we conclude that board 
independence not only statistically but also economically significantly affects bank loan price. 
Consider next the effect of board size on bank loan price. In Columns 4, 5 and 6, we use three 
different proxies to measure board size. The first is a binary variable, Large board, which equals 
one if a board has more than 9 directors and zero otherwise. The second is Log (size), the natural 
logarithm of total number of directors on a board. And the third is Board to firm size, the total 
number of directors on a board relative to total assets of the firm, to control for firm size effect. 
The coefficient estimates of the three proxies are all significantly negative at the 1% level. Our 
coefficient estimates indicate that bank loan spread is about 11% lower for borrowers with large 
boards than for borrowers with small boards, and 1% increase of board size reduces loan spread 
about 0.25%. 
In Column 7, we test the duality effect on loan price using a binary variable, Duality, which 
equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of a board, and zero otherwise. Unlike the result we 
find in the univariate test, the insignificant coefficient implies that duality has no effect on bank 
loan price once we control for firm, loan, and macroeconomic conditions. In Column 8, we 
specify three main traits of board structure, Composition, Log (size)  and  Duality,  in one 
regression simultaneously. We find that Composition and Log (size) are still negatively associated 
with bank loan price, while Duality  is  insignificantly related to loan price. Overall, Table 3 
indicates that firms with large or independent boards face lower bank loan price. The results 
indicate  that independent and large board provides superior monitoring of the management, 
leading to lower interest rates of bank loans.
11
                                                 
11 We also test whether corporate boards affect different transaction fees  including commitment fees, 
upfront fees and annual fees. The results show that our main testing variables, board independence and 
board size, are significantly negatively correlated with those fees, indicating banks charge lower fees to 
borrowers with more independent and large boards.  
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In terms of control variables, the coefficient estimate of G-index is significantly negative at 
least at the 5% level for different model specifications, although the economic magnitude is 
relatively small. 
12
With regard to loan characteristics, we find Log (facility) is negatively, while Log (maturity) 
and Rating are positively related to loan spread. Those results are consistent with our expectations 
and prior findings, such as Graham et al. (2008) and Qian and Strahan (2007). In terms of the 
effect of existing client relationship, we find Prior relations is significantly positively associated 
with loan spread. This supports Sharp (1990) and Rajan (1992) lock up conjecture of banking 
relationship that predicts the extraction of rents over the course of the bank-firm relationship. 
 The result is consistent with the findings of Klock et al. (2004) and Chava et al. 
(2009). They explain that lower ATPs score increases the takeover vulnerability, which in turns 
increases debt holders’ potential financial risk after the takeover. Consistent with our expectations 
and previous findings, We also find Log (assets), Tangibility, Profitability, Market to book, and 
Z-score are all significantly negatively related to loan spread, while Leverage is positively related 
to loan spread. Hence, firms with higher default risk face higher loan price.  
For macroeconomic conditions, we find Credit spread is significantly positively related to 
bank loan spread at 1% level, indicating that market based default risk is reflected in individual 
loan spread. For Term spread, we find it is not significantly related to bank loan spread in most 
model specifications.  
 
5.1.2. Audit committee structure, other director characteristics and bank loan price 
Because of the importance of audit committee in monitoring financial reporting process and 
providing creditable financial information to banks, we examine next the relation between audit 
committee structure and bank loan price. In Column 1 of Table 4, we use following proxies to 
                                                 
12 In the G-index, some provisions are directly related to board of directors. To mitigate the correlation 
between G-index and board characteristics, we first regress G-index on board characteristics. Then we use 
the residuals obtained from the regression as the proxy for other corporate governance. The results are 
quantitatively unchanged. 24 
 
measure audit committee structure: Audit composition is the fraction of outside directors in an 
audit committee; Log (audit size) is the natural logarithm of the total number of directors in an 
audit committee; Audit duality is a binary variable which equals one if the CEO is also a member 
of the audit committee and zero otherwise; and Audit financial expert is a binary variable which 
equals one if there is at least one  financial expert sitting on the audit committee and zero 
otherwise. Following Anderson et al. (2004), we denote financial consultants, investment bankers, 
investment managers, bankers, auditors and CEOs of financial companies as financial experts.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
We find that Audit composition and Log (audit size) are significantly negatively associated 
with bank loan spread at the 1% level. The coefficient estimates indicate that 1% increase of audit 
committee composition or size will reduce bank loan spread about 0.20% or 0.16%, respectively. 
Similar to the insignificant effect of Duality, we find that Audit duality has no significant impact 
on bank loan price. We also find that Audit financial expert  is significantly  and negatively 
associated with bank loan spread. Overall, the results in Column 1 indicate that audit committee 
structure, including independence, size and financial experts, also influences bank loan price. The 
results are also  consistent with the prediction that the monitoring role of audit committee is 
important to banks too.  
In Column 2 of Table 4, we test whether other board characteristics affect bank loan price. The 
indicator variable Woman, that equals one if there is at least one female director on the board and 
zero otherwise, and Diversity, the fraction of African Americans, Asians and Hispanics on the 
board of directors, are both significantly negatively related to bank loan price. Hence, more 
diversified  boards, including both gender and ethnic diversities,  seem more effective in 
monitoring management than homogeneous boards, and resulting in lower bank loan price.  
We also find that Log (tenure), the natural logarithm of the average tenure of total directors in 
a board, is negatively associated with bank loan price in our sample, which supports the expertise 
hypothesis of extended tenure, that long term directors’ engagement reflects greater experience, 25 
 
commitment and more effectiveness in monitoring management. However, we find Log (age), the 
natural logarithm of the average age of total directors in a board, is positively related to bank loan 
spread, which indicates that the efficacy of monitoring declines with average board member age, 
leading to higher bank loan price. We find that Directorship, the average number of directorships 
held by total directors in a board, is positively related to bank loan price, although the economic 
magnitude is very small.  The result suggests  that “busy” boards monitor management less 
effectively, leading to higher bank loan price.  
We find that Blockholder, captured by a dummy variable which equals one if at least one 
director holds more than 5% of total shares, is positively related to bank loan price. However, the 
economic magnitude is relatively small. The result is in line with Skaife et al. (2005), who argue 
that the presence of blockholders results in greater agency risk between blockholders and 
debtholders. Banks majorly consider agency risk of debt when there are blockholders on the 
board and charge higher bank loan price to compensate their risk. We also find that Shareholding, 
the ownership percentage of all directors on the board, as a fraction of total shares outstanding, is 
also positively related to bank loan price. Potentially, banks require a higher compensation for 
higher (perceived) agency risk of debt when board members hold more equity of the firms. 
In contrast to our expectations, we find that Interlock, a dummy variable which equals one if at 
least one director on the board is an interlocked director, is negatively related to bank loan spread. 
This result is not consistent with Hallock (1997), who argue that the presence of interlocked 
directors compromises the effectiveness of board monitoring. It is possible that the presence of 
interlocked  directors leads to  more entrenched  management, which reduces  the takeover 
vulnerability of the firm. So we interpret that an interlocked board has the same effect as G-index 
on bank loan price (Chava (2009)). We find the coefficient estimate of Less attendance, a dummy 
variable which equals one if at least one director on the board who attend less than 75% board 
meetings in a year, and zero otherwise, is insignificant on loan price in our sample, suggesting the 
frequencies of attendances of board meetings have little discernible impact on bank loan price.   26 
 
In Column 3, we combine all of the variables in a single regression to test the incremental 
explanatory powers of different board characteristics on bank loan price. Again, we find that 
board structure including composition and size, and audit committee structure including 
composition, size and financial experts, are still negatively related to bank loan price. Other 




5.1.3. Robustness checks 
The unit of our analysis is a loan facility. However, loan contract terms are generally 
negotiated on the deal level which may include several interrelated loan facilities. In addition, a 
borrower can obtain several facilities in the same year. Those facilities may not be independent. 
Treating these correlated loans independently may lead to biased results and overstate statistical 
significance. To deal with this issue, we use a reduced-sample which includes only the largest 
facility for each firm year and rerun the OLS regression in Column 3 of Table 4. The results are 
reported in Column 1 of Table 5. We find that our main testing variables are continuously 
significantly related with bank loan price, expect for Woman (dummy), which turns into 
insignificant at traditional 10% level. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
It is possible that unobservable firm characteristics that are stable over could affect bank loan 
price. To deal with this issue, we conduct a firm and year fixed effect regression. Column 2 of 
Table 5 reports the result. We find that the coefficients of our main variables of interest, such as 
Composition and Board Size, are similar to the results in Column 3 of Table 4.  
We also investigate whether our result is driven by a few loans with extreme loan spreads. We 
perform a median regression that estimates the effect of explanatory variables on the median loan 
spread, conditional on the values of explanatory variables. According results in Column 3 of 
                                                 
13 We test whether multicollinearity problems exist for all regressions presented in this section. The highest 
variance inflation factor (VIF) for any regressors is 4.38, which is well below the threshold indicator of 10. 27 
 
Table 5 are similar to those from the average response regression (OLS) in Column 3 of Table 4, 
except for Shareholding, which becomes insignificant in the median regression. Overall, we 
conclude that our results are not driven by outliers. 
A potential issue in the previous regressions is that one of the independent variables, loan 
maturity, may be endogenous because loan spread and maturity could be  simultaneously 
determined in a bank loan contract (Strahan (1999), Dennis et al. (2000) and Bharath et al. 
(2008)). In such a case, our single equation results may be biased. To deal with this potential 
endogenous problem, we employ two stage least square regressions using asset maturity as the 
instrument for loan maturity. 
14
In sum, the impact of corporate boards on bank loan price is robust to a series of checks and 
remains economically and statistically significant.
 The results from the two stage regressions are reported in Column 





5.1.4. Addressing endogeneity of boards of directors: The impact of SOX on bank loan price 
As board structure is supposed to endogenously determined, empirical work on corporate 
boards always faces the endogeneity problem which makes results hard to interpret (Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1998)). In our study, although the feedback mechanism from bank loan terms on 
board structure is less likely, one can still argue that board structure is correlated with some risk 
factors which we do not consider in our single equations, or there is no causal relation between 
corporate boards and bank loan terms.  
                                                 
14 Graham et al. (2008) explain why asset maturity is an appropriate instrument for loan maturity in the loan 
spread regression. 
15 We also test the possible non-linearity regarding the effect of board size on bank loan price. We include 
the square of board size and square of audit committee size in the regressions. Both squared terms are not 
significantly different from zero. In addition, piecewise regressions also confirm that large boards are 
associated with a lower bank loan price. 28 
 
One way to solve the  endogeneity problem is to use instrument variable (IV) methods. 
However, it is difficult to find suitable instruments to identify board variables that we are 
concerned with. An alternative to the IV regression is a natural experiment that uses an 
exogenous shock to identify the board effect. Fortunately, the passage of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX) and the NYSE and NASDAQ new listing rules pursuant to SOX provide a good 
setting for this test. 
One objective of SOX and the new listing requirements is to enhance corporate governance by 
increasing the independence of corporate boards. Although SOX does not specifically require 
boards to have majority independent boards, both the NYSE and NASDAQ new listing rules 
require firms to have majority independent boards. These new listing requirements pursuant to 
SOX imply an increase in the level of board independence brought about by factors exogenous to 
the firm. In fact, Linck et al. (2008) find that corporate boards have become more independent 
after SOX. Furthermore, as SOX and new listing rules mandate a set of changes not only for the 
independence of boards of directors, but also for the effectiveness of internal controls, auditor 
independence, the responsibility of CEOs and CFOs to certify the “material accuracy and 
completeness of financial statements.” and others. Testing the effect of SOX and the new listing 
rules on bank loan price also helps us to examine how the exogenous shock to the overall firm’s 
governance structure leads to a change of the cost of bank loans.
 16
We separate our sample into a four-year pre-SOX period (1998-2001) and a four-year post-
SOX period (2003-2006). The year 2002 is dropped as it is the year reforms were enacted. To 
fairly compare bank loan price before and after SOX, we remove firms that only have pre-SOX 
 
                                                 
16 For example, Section 202 requires that all auditing services and all permitted non-auditing services to be 
pre-approved by the client firm’s independent audit committee.  Section 302 requires each public 
company’s CEO and CFO to certify that they have reviewed the quarterly and annual reports their 
companies file with the SEC. Section 404 mandates the company to disclose the assessment of internal 
control weakness in the annual report and requires the external auditor of the company to attest to the 
internal control assessment in the audit report.  29 
 
loans or only have post-SOX loans. 
17
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 SOX is a dummy variable which equals one if a facility is 
initiated after 2002 and zero if a facility is initiated before 2002. Table 6 reports how bank loan 
spread changes after SOX. In Column 1, we find the estimated coefficient of SOX is -0.043 and is 
significant at the 10% level, which indicates that the average bank loan spread is about 4.30% 
lower in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period. This result suggests that banks 
evaluate the effect of SOX as strengthening corporate governance, resulting in lower bank loan 
price.  
Linck et al. (2008) report more board structure changes for small firms than for large firms. 
Therefore, we separate the sample based on the median value of total assets to test whether the 
effect of SOX on bank loan price is different for large and small firms. The results are in Column 
2 and Column 3 of Table 6. We find that SOX has no significant impact on loan price of large 
firms. But it significantly impacts loan spread of small firms. The estimate coefficient is -0.131 
and significant at the 1% level. The result shows for small firms, bank loan price is about 13% 
lower in post-SOX era than pre-SOX era. Therefore, the impact of SOX on bank loan price of 
small firms is economically meaningful. In general, the governance systems of small firms are 
weaker than large firms before SOX. For instance, small firms’ boards are less independent, 
smaller and less likely to have audit committees than large firms’ boards before SOX. SOX and 
new listing requirements mandate small firms to strengthen their corporate governance systems 
dramatically, which results in significant deductions of bank loan price. Linck et al. (2008) find 
SOX imposed a disproportionate burden on small firms to fulfill the requirements of SOX. Here, 
we detect some benefits in the form of lower bank funding cost that accrue to small firms due to 
SOX.  
                                                 
17 Including firms that only have pre-SOX or post-SOX loans in the analysis yields essentially the same 
results.  30 
 
In Column 4 of Table 6, relying on a difference-in-difference approach, we further investigate 
whether the compliance with board independence requirement leads to a lower bank loan price.
18 
Changing firms  is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm changes from an insider-
dominated board to an outsider-dominated board after SOX.
19
 
. We compare the change of bank 
loan price of the Changing firms  (treated group) to the change of bank loan price of firms 
unaffected by the new listing rules regarding board independence (control group).We find the 
coefficient estimate of the interaction term, SOX*Changing firms, is -0.264 and significant at the 
1% level. The result indicates that the decline of bank loan price is more pronounced for firms 
who comply with board independence requirement by regulations after SOX compared to 
unaffected firms. The result also suggests that board independence brings about, and not merely 
reflect, a reduced bank loan price. 
5.1.5. Interaction of board independence and borrower/loan characteristics  
Previous research find that a number of factors, such as accounting quality, property and 
shareholder rights, etc., affect bank loan price differently for different firm and loan 
characteristics (e.g., Bharath, et al. (2008), Qian and Strahan (2007) and Chava et al. (2009)). In 
this section, we try to investigate whether the effect of corporate boards on bank loans is also 
heterogeneous. As we identify board independence as one of the most important determinants of 
bank loan price, we focus on Composition  and interact it with different borrower and loan 
characteristics to find how the impact of board independence on bank loans varies under different 
firm and loan environments. 
                                                 
18 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allowed extended deadlines to July 15, 2007 for 
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance for small public companies (market capitalization of $700 million or less). 
19 SOX and following the NYSE and the Nasdaq new listing requirements have no mandated requirements 
about board size and duality. 31 
 
In Table 7, we first create sub-samples based on the median value of Leverage, Tangibility and 
G-index (ATPs) level, and test how the effect of Composition on bank loan price differently for 
different borrower characteristics. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
A higher leverage level indicates higher default risk of the firm. In Column 1 of Table 7, we 
find that the coefficient estimate of Composition, which captures the effect of board independence 
on bank loan spread for below median leverage level firms, is -0.237 with a t-statistic of -3.40. 
The interaction term between High-leverage and Composition, which captures the incremental 
effect of board independence on bank loan spread for above median leverage level firms, is -
0.196 with a t-statistic of -2.29.
20
High Tangibility indicates less opaque assets of firms (Strahan (1999)). In Column 2 of Table 7, 
we find a negative and significant coefficient for Composition, while the coefficient estimate of 
the interaction term between High-tangibility and Composition is positive and significant. Thus, 
the impact of board independence on bank loan price is mitigated for firms with more tangible 
assets. The results show a substitution relation between the quality of the board and the tangible 
assets. Since lenders can recover exposures through tangible assets in case of default, they pay 
less attention to the quality of boards when borrowers have higher tangible assets. 
 Hence, the impact of board independence on bank loan price is 
more pronounced for higher leveraged firms than for less leveraged firms. The results suggest 
that banks pay more attention to the quality of boards when price bank loans if borrowers have 
higher default risk. 
A higher anti-takeover provision level indicates a lower takeover vulnerability and thus lower 
default risk of debt (Klock et al. (2004) and Chava (2009)). In Column 3, we test how ATPs level 
affects the impact of board independence on bank loan price. While Composition is significantly 
negatively related to bank loan price, the interaction term between High-G-index  and 
                                                 
20 The F-test of the effect of board independence on bank loan spread for high leverage firms (-0.237-
0.196=-0.433) is significantly negative at the 1% level. 32 
 
Composition is significantly positively related to bank loan price. In line with earlier results, the 
role of board independence on loan price is reduced when firms have higher levels of ATPs.  
In sum, Table 7 shows that the role of board independence on loan price is more pronounced 
for firms with higher default risk and with more opaque assets.  
Risk levels of different loan types and structures are also significantly different. Next, we 
bisect our full sample based on different loan characteristics. First, we distinguish whether loans 
are Term loans or Lines of credits. Second, we separate our sample based on whether loans are 
Syndicated loans or Sole loans. Thereby, we investigate how the effect of board independence on 
bank loan price differs across loan characteristics.
21
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
In Column 1 of Table 8, we find that the coefficient estimate of Composition, which captures 
the effect of board independence on bank loan spread for line of credit loans, is -0.295, with a t-
statistic of -6.14. The interaction term between Term loan and Composition, which capture the 
incremental effect of board independence on bank loan spread for term loans, is 0.174 with a t-
statistic of 1.72. The results indicate a weaker effect of board independence on bank loan price for 
Term loans than for Lines of credits. Strahan (1999) and Bae and Goyal (2009) argue that credit 
lines are riskier than term loans due to additional liquidity risk inherent to the former. Our result 
indicates that the effect of board independence on bank loan price is more critical for loans with 
higher risk than for loans with lower risk.  
In Column 2 of Table 8, the significant and positive coefficient estimate of the interaction term 
between Sole Loans and Composition indicates that the impact of board independence on loan 
price is more pronounced for Syndicated Loans than for Sole Loans. Syndicated loans are usually 
more risky than sole loans and resemble public debt more closely given their dispersed ownership. 
The result further implies the effect of board independence is more important for more risk loans. 
                                                 
21 We also test the interaction between loan rating (investment grade loans or non-investment grade loans) 
and board composition. However, we do not find significantly different effects of board composition on 
loan price for different loan ratings.  33 
 
Usually, in syndicated loans, lead banks do not hold 100% of the loans, and they also can sell part 
of the loans in the secondary loan market after loan initiations, these reduce their monitoring 
incentive. In this case, they are more likely to free ride on other corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as board of directors, to monitor the borrowers. 
 
5.2. Corporate boards, non-price loan terms and loan ownership 
In this section, we investigate whether board characteristics affect non-price loan terms and 
loan ownership. Because collateral, covenants and performance pricing are important features of 
bank loan contracts, we focus on how board characteristics impact these three non-price loan 
terms. In addition, we also test whether board characteristics affect number of lenders in 
syndicated loans.  
 
5.2.1. Corporate boards and loan securitization 
Collateral requirement is a common term in loan contracts which is used to mitigate adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems (Jimenez et al. (2006)). We first study the impact of 
different board characteristics on the likelihood of a loan being secured using a logit model. Our 
control variables are similar to those  used in loan price regression except that  we exclude 
macroeconomic factors. Following Dennis et al. (2000) and others, we add Regulated, which is a 
dummy variable that equals one for firms in the utility industry (SIC code 4900-4999), and Loan 
concentration, which is the loan amount divided by total debt in the regression. Highly regulated 
companies should have less serve agency problems, which in turn result in less use of collateral. 
In addition, if a loan is a significant proportion of the firm’s total debt, it is more likely to be 
secured.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
According results are shown in Column 1 of Table 9. We find Composition negatively affects 
the likelihood of a loan being secured significantly. The marginal effect of Composition implies 34 
 
that the probability of a loan being secured decrease by 0.20% if we increase board independence 
by 1%.
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With regard to the additional control variables, in line with our expectations, we find that 
Regulated and Loan concentration are significantly negative and positive related to the likelihood 
of collateral being used in loan contracts, respectively.  
 The result indicates that  banks  expect  the ex-post default risk of firms with more 
independent boards to be lower than firms with less independent boards. Therefore, the former 
are less likely required to provide collateral in their bank loan contracts ex-ante. In addition, we 
find that the coefficient estimates of Audit composition, Audit financial expert, Diversity, Log 
(tenure) are also negative and significant, indicating audit committee structure, board diversity 
and director tenure also affect the likelihood of a loan being secured. Although the coefficient 
estimate of Directorship  is significant at 10% level, the economic magnitude is very small. 
Unlike significant effects of board size and audit committee size on loan price, we find that 
coefficient estimates of both Log (size) and Log (audit size) are insignificant at conventional 
confidence levels. This indicates that board  size  and audit committee size do not affect the 
likelihood of a loan being secured. Overall, the results imply that certain board characteristics, 
especially board and audit committee independence, affect the likelihood of loans being secured 
significantly.  
 
5.2.2. Corporate boards and loan covenants 
Covenants are the traditional way used by debt holders in debt contracts to restrict managers’ 
actions that may reduce the value of debt (e.g., Smith and Warner (1979)). General covenants 
place restrictions on prepayment, dividends and voting rights, etc. Financial covenants impose 
limits on accounting ratios and variables. Next, we estimate two logit models to test the impacts 
of different board characteristics on the likelihood of a loan being subject to general or financial 
                                                 




We find that the coefficient estimates of Composition in Columns 2 and 3 are both negative 
and significant. Economically, if we increase board independence by 1%, the probability of 
imposing general or financial covenants on a loan decrease by 0.29% or 0.20%, respectively. This 
is consistent with the expectation that if the board of directors of a firm is more independent, 
banks will rely more on board monitoring and reduce their own monitoring intensities. Thus 
banks are less likely to use covenants in loan contracts. We also find that Audit composition and 
Interlock affect the likelihood of using covenants in loan contracts significantly and negatively. 
Overall, our results indicate that corporate boards also affect the likelihood of banks requiring 
both general and financial covenants in loan contracts. 
 Nash et al. (2001) find when a firm has higher investment opportunities, it is less 
likely to use covenants in debt contracts. Therefore, we add an additional variable R&D, which is 
the research and development expenditure divided by total assets in the regression. The according 
results are shown in Column 2 and 3 of Table 9. 
For the additional control variable R&D, we find it is significantly negatively related to the 
likelihood of using both general and financial covenants in bank loan contracts. The results are 
consistent with  Nash et al. (2001) who argue that  it is less likely to use covenants in debt 
contracts if a borrower has higher growth opportunities. 
  
5.2.3. Corporate boards and performance pricing provision 
Performance pricing is a relatively new provision in bank loan contracts, which varies loan 
price with the borrowers’ credit rating or financial performance. Asquith et al. (2005) discuss the 
increasing use of performance pricing provision in syndicated loans to control for higher moral 
hazard costs and uncertainty of the firm. We next estimate a logit model to test the impact of 
board characteristics on the likelihood of a loan using performance pricing term. Following 
                                                 
23 Pearson correlation statistics show that the presence of the general covenants is significantly positively 
correlated with the presence of financial covenants. This finding is consistent with banks viewing different 
types of covenants as complements rather than substitutes. 36 
 
Asquith et al. (2005), we add two addition control variables in the regression. Analyst forecast 
dispersion  is the standard deviation of actual earnings-deflated individual analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Higher dispersion of analyst forecast lead to more likely use of performance pricing 
provision  in loan contracts. Syndication  is a dummy variable which equals one if a loan is 
syndicated and zero otherwise. To reduce the renegotiation costs among syndication members, 
syndicated loans are more likely to use performance pricing provisions in loan  contracts 
compared to single lender loans.  
According results are shown in Column 4 of Table 9. The significantly negative coefficient 
estimate of Composition indicates if we increase board independence by 1%, the likelihood of a 
loan using performance pricing provisions will decrease by 0.44%. We also find Log (size) is 
significantly negatively related to the likelihood of a loan using performance pricing, but the 
marginal effect is relatively small (0.08%) compared to Composition. In addition, we find that 
both coefficient estimates of Audit composition and Interlock (dummy) are significantly negative, 
and the coefficient estimate of blockholder (dummy) is significantly positive. In sum, the above 
results  indicate  that  several  board  characteristics,  including  both  board and audit committee 
independence, affect the likelihood of using performance pricing provision in loan contracts.  
For the additional control variables, we find both coefficient estimates of Analyst forecast 
dispersion and Syndication are positive and significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with 
our expectation.  
Overall, our results on non-price loan terms have at least two important implications. First, 
banks consider the role of corporate boards in governance when designing bank loan contracts not 
only on price term, but also on non-price terms. Second, it seems that banks pay most attention to 
board and audit committee independence, as they are the two testing variables which significantly 
affect the likelihood of using all of the four non-price terms considered here. 
 
5.2.4. Corporate boards and bank loan structure  37 
 
Sufi (2007) finds when information asymmetries are severe, and the credit risk of the borrower 
is high, the structure of syndicated loans is more concentrated with fewer lenders. We further 
analyze the effects of board characteristics on loan syndicate structure as measured by the total 
number of lenders in a loan. The result is provided in Column 5 of Table 9. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of lenders in a loan.  
We find that Composition is significant positively related to the number of lenders, which 
indicates more lenders participate in syndicated loans if the borrower has a more independent 
board. Economically, 1% increase of board independence will result in approximately 0.20% 
more lenders in a loan. In the regression, we also find Audit financial expert, Woman, Interlock 
(dummy) and Diversity are positively, and Log (tenure) is negatively related to the number of 
lenders in syndicated loans. Overall, consistent with our expectation, we find that corporate 
boards impact not only bank loan contract terms, but also bank loan structure as measured by the 
number of lenders in loans. 
 
5.3 Exploring simultaneities among price and non-price loan terms 
Melnik and Planut (1986) point out that bank loans is a package of multiple contract terms, 
which cannot be split and traded separately. Empirically, Dennis et al. (2000) find certain loan 
contract terms are jointly determined. Although our previous estimations using reduced-form 
regressions are perfectly valid (Dennis et al. (2000)), a richer alternative is to use simultaneous 
equation models considering interrelations among contract terms. Based on Nelson and Olson's 
(1978), we employ a two-stage estimation procedure for simultaneous equation models with 
limited dependent variables. Our endogenous loan terms include Log (spread), Secured (dummy), 
Performance pricing (dummy) and Covenant (dummy), which equals one if there is at least one 
covenant restriction in a loan contract and zero otherwise. Following Dennis et al. (2000) and 
Asquith et al. (2005), we assume  a uni-directional relationship  from  Secured (dummy), 
Performance pricing (dummy) and  Covenant (dummy)  to  Log (spread),  while  we allow bi-38 
 
directional relationships between Secured (dummy)  and  Covenant (dummy),  and between 
Performance pricing (dummy) and Log (spread).  
In the first stage, we estimate reduced-form OLS or  logit regressions  for each of the 
endogenous variables. From these estimates, we obtain fitted values for each of the endogenous 
variables. In the second stage, we use the fitted values for the endogenous variables on the right-
hand side of equations and then estimate the respective equations using OLS and logit regressions. 
As before, we are concerned about a potential endogeneity of loan maturity, therefore, we use an 
instrumental variable (asset maturity as an instrument for loan maturity) approach to estimate 
reduced-form equations  for loan maturity. Fitted values from the reduced-form are then 
substituted for loan maturity in the second stage estimates of the four structural equations in the 
model. 
 [Insert Table 10 here] 
The results in Table 10 show that certain loan contract terms are interrelated. Specifically, we 
find that Covenant (dummy) is significantly positively related to Log (spread). But, we do not 
detect significant effects of Secured (dummy) and Performance pricing (dummy) on Log (spread). 
The results suggest that loans with higher interest rates are also more likely to use covenants in 
loan contracts. Moreover, we find significant and negative bi-directional relationships between 
Covenant (dummy) and Secured (dummy), which indicate a substitution relation between the use 
of collateral and the use of covenants in loan contracts. Finally, we find Log (spread)  is 
negatively related to Performance pricing (dummy), suggesting that loans with lower initial 
interest rates are more likely to have performance pricing provision in loan contracts. 
In terms of board effect, we find that, after considering the simultaneities among different loan 
contract terms, the effect of corporate boards on both price and non-price loan terms is still 
statistically and economically significant. Compared  to reduced-form regressions, we find a 
smaller effect of Composition on bank loan price but an increased effect on all non-price loan 
terms. Also, both Audit composition and Audit financial expert (dummy) negatively impact all 39 
 
price and non-price loan terms  in the two stage structure model. The effects of other board 
characteristics on bank loan contracts are  also similar to those in reduced-form regressions. 
Overall, we conclude that the effect of corporate boards on bank loan contracts remain significant 
after considering the interdependences among loan contract terms. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we study the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find, first, 
lenders extend favorable price and non-price loan terms when corporate boards are more 
independent. In addition, more lenders participate in syndicated loans if borrowers have more 
independent boards. Second, several other board characteristics, such as larger board size, more 
independent and larger audit committee, more diversified boards and longer director tenure, also 
reduce bank loan price. However, those board characteristics do not consistently affect non-price 
loan terms and loan ownership. Third, the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting is 
more critical when dealing with high-default risk borrowers, more opaque borrowers and high-
default risk loans. Overall, our main findings support that banks do take into account the benefits 
of board monitoring in reducing agency risk and information risk when designing loan contracts. 
Using SOX and the NYSE and NASDAQ new listing rules pursuant to SOX as natural 
experiment, we find bank loan price is significantly lower for post-SOX period than for pre-SOX 
period, and the impact of the new regulations on bank loan price is only effective for small firms 
but not for large firms. The difference-in-difference analysis confirms that firms who comply 
with independence requirement after SOX enjoy more discounts of bank loan price compared to 
unaffected firms, and it mitigates the endogeneity concern of our study. 
In sum, this paper comprehensively investigates the effects of different board characteristics on 
bank loan contracting. Our results suggest that several board aspects, especially board and audit 
committee independence, provide measureable benefits to firms through favorable bank loan 
contract terms. The results also indicate that board and committee independence are important 40 
 
indicators of good quality of board, at least from banks’ perspective. Furthermore, our study fills 
a gap in the literature on the determinants of bank loan contract terms. This study provides direct 
evidence that banks appear to actively consider corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
corporate boards, when designing loan contracts. In extension to most previous studies on 
corporate boards and cost of debt, which focus only on a single dimension of costs of debt such as 
interest rates, we show that various aspects of loan contracts are affected by firm’s board 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the data employed in our analysis. The data set is comprised of 9,621 loan facility level and 4,160 firm level observations for 
the period 1996–2006. Size is the total number of directors on the board. Outsider is the total number of independent directors on the board. Composition is the 
percentage of independent directors, as a fraction of total directors on the board. Duality is a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board, and zero otherwise. Audit size is the total number of directors on the audit committee. Audit outsider is the total number of independent directors on the audit 
committee. Audit composition is the percentage of independent directors, as a fraction of total directors on the audit committee. Audit duality a dummy variable which 
equals one if the CEO is also a member of the audit committee, and zero otherwise. Audit financial expert is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one of the 
audit committee member is a financial expert, and zero otherwise. Woman is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one of the board member is a female, and 
zero otherwise. Diversity is the percentage of minority directors, including African Americans, Asians and Hispanics, as a fraction of total directors on the board. Age is 
the average age of total directors on the board. Tenure is the average tenure of total directors on the board. Directorship is the average number of directorship held by 
total directors in a board. Less attendance is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director in a board who attend less than 75% board meetings in a year, 
and zero otherwise. Interlock is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director in a board is an interlocked director. Board shareholding is the ownership 
percentage of all directors on the board, as a fraction of shares outstanding. Blockholder is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director on the board holds 
more than 5% shares of the firm, and zero otherwise. Total assets is the total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as the long term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
divided by total assets. Tangibility is defined as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided by total 
assets Market to book is defined as the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which equals 
(1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. G-index is Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index. Spread is 
the all-in spread drawn which is defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down. Secured is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a loan is secured by collateral, and zero otherwise. Performance pricing is a dummy variable which equals one if there is a 
performance pricing provision in the loan contract, and zero otherwise. General covenant is a dummy variable which equals one if there is a general covenant provision 
in the loan contract, and zero otherwise. Financial covenant is a dummy variable which equals one if there is a financial covenant provision in the loan contract, and 
zero otherwise. Rating is defined as rating score from 1 to 6 with one indicating an Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating 
a Bbb rating, five indicating a Bb rating, and six indicating a B or worse rating. Facility is the total amount of loan facility. Maturity is the loan maturity time. Number 
of lenders is the total number of lenders in a loan. Prior relations is the total number of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. 
All variables are measured in the fiscal year when loans are initiated, except for firm characteristics variable which are estimated one year prior to loan initiated year. 
Number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (STD), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) are reported in the table. 
 
  N  Mean  STD  Min  Max 
Board characteristics       
Size  4160  9.76  2.55  3.00  21.00 
Outsider  4160  6.60  2.49  1.00  17.00 
Composition (%)  4160  67.18  17.36  9.09  100.00 
Duality (dummy)  4160  0.82  0.38  0.00  1.00 
Audit size  4160  3.24  1.75  0.00  11.00 
Audit outsider  4160  2.93  1.71  0.00  11.00 
Audit composition (%)  4160  90.79  16.77  14.29  100.00 
Audit duality (dummy)  4160  0.11  0.31  0.00  1.00 
Audit financial expert (dummy)  4160  0.64  0.73  0.00  1.00 
Woman (dummy)  4160  0.64  0.48  0.00  1.00 45 
 
Diversity (%)  4160  53.77  39.13  0.00  100.00 
Age  4160  59.14  3.74  40.80  74.43 
Tenure  4160  9.16  3.55  1.00  27.40 
Directorship  4160  3.03  2.40  0.00  9.00 
Less attendance (dummy)  4160  0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00 
Interlock (dummy)  4160  0.08  0.26  0.00  1.00 
Board shareholding (%)  4160  9.02  17.39  0.00  100.00 
Blockholder (dummy)  4160  0.16  0.37  0.00  1.00 
Firm characteristics       
Total assets (million)  4160  9516.17  30701.10  1.84  1157248.00 
Leverage  4160  0.29  0.16  0.00  0.98 
Tangibility  4160  0.65  0.39  0.00  0.97 
Profitability  4160  0.14  0.09  -0.95  0.94 
Market to book  4160  1.83  1.16  0.34  16.66 
Z-score  4160  1.78  1.33  -27.90  16.65 
G-index  4160  9.79  2.20  3.00  17.00 
 
Loan characteristics       
Spread (basis points)  9621  120.98  95.90  5.50  1000.00 
Secured (dummy)  5223  0.50  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Performance pricing (dummy)  9621  0.52  0.50  0.00  1.00 
General covenant (dummy)  9621  0.59  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Financial covenant (dummy)  9621  0.61  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Rating  9621  4.67  1.24  1.00  6.00 
Facility (million)  9621  493.00  906.00  1.00  25000.00 
Maturity (months)  9621  42.77  27.98  2.00  360.00 
Number of lenders  9621  10.22  9.59  1.00  118.00 
Prior relations  9621  3.76  4.19  0.00  43.00 
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Table 2 Comparisons of different board structures 
 
This table presents summary statistics of the loan characteristics and firm characteristics for different board structures including board independence (whether board 
composition is more than 50%), board size (whether board size is more than 9) and board duality. Spread is the all-in spread drawn which is defined as the amount the 
borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down. Secured is a dummy variable which equals one if a loan is secured by 
collateral, and zero otherwise. Performance pricing is a dummy variable which equals one if there is a performance pricing provision in the loan contract, and zero 
otherwise. General covenant is a dummy variable which equals one if there is a general covenant provision in the loan contract, and zero otherwise. Financial covenant 
is a dummy variable which equals one if there is a financial covenant provision in the loan contract, and zero otherwise. Number of lenders is the total number of 
lenders in a loan. Total assets is the total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as the long term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. Tangibility is 
defined as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided by total assets Market to book is defined as the 
market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Number of observations (N), mean, and standard deviation (STD) are reported for each sub-
sample. The means of the differences between the variables for two sub-samples and absolute value of t-statistics are also reported. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Dependent board vs. Independent board 
  Dependent Board  Independent Board     
  N  Mean  STD  N  Mean  STD  Difference  T-statistics 
Loan characteristics                 
Spread  1997  151.155  106.315  7722  115.399  97.109  35.755***  [14.38] 
Secured (dummy)  1202  0.649  0.478  4064  0.448  0.497  0.201***  [12.44] 
Performance pricing (dummy)  1997  0.542  0.498  7722  0.498  0.500  0.044***  [3.48] 
General covenant (dummy)  1997  0.632  0.482  7722  0.582  0.493  0.050***  [4.07] 
Financial covenant (dummy)  1997  0.661  0.473  7722  0.590  0.492  0.071***  [5.80] 
Number of lenders  1997  9.351  9.955  7722  10.401  9.460  -1.050***  [4.37] 
Firm characteristics                 
Total assets  1237  5570.522  23939.100  6001  12450.870  39317.610  -6880.345***  [5.93] 
Leverage  1237  0.330  0.214  6001  0.299  0.149  0.031***  [6.17] 
Tangibility  1237  0.577  0.390  6001  0.665  0.386  -0.088***  [7.29] 
Profitability  1237  0.146  0.086  6001  0.140  0.089  0.006**  [2.00] 







               
Panel B: Small board vs. Large board               
  Small Board  Large Board     
  N  Mean  STD  N  Mean  STD  Difference  T-statistics 
Loan characteristics                 
Spread  6064  140.699  104.063  3655  92.961  85.234  47.737***  [23.40] 
Secured (dummy)  3509  0.571  0.495  1757  0.340  0.474  0.231***  [16.18] 
Performance pricing (dummy)  6064  0.533  0.499  3655  0.463  0.499  0.070***  [6.70] 
General covenant (dummy)  6064  0.627  0.484  3655  0.534  0.499  0.093***  [9.11] 
Financial covenant (dummy)  6064  0.641  0.480  3655  0.544  0.498  0.098***  [9.57] 47 
 
Number of lenders  6064  8.898  8.707  3655  12.321  10.516  -3.423***  [17.34] 
Firm characteristics                 
Total assets  4139  5226.073  12250.300  3099  19353.880  54070.660  -14127.810***  [16.26] 
Leverage  4139  0.295  0.168  3099  0.317  0.154  -0.022***  [5.69] 
Tangibility  4139  0.614  0.393  3099  0.699  0.375  -0.085***  [9.31] 
Profitability  4139  0.143  0.094  3099  0.138  0.079  0.005**  [2.46] 
Market to book  4139  1.789  1.122  3099  1.790  1.143  -0.001  [0.05] 
Panel C: Non-duality board vs. Duality board             
  Non-Duality Board  Duality Board     
  N  Mean  STD  N  Mean  STD  Difference  T-statistics 
Loan characteristics                 
Spread  1653  134.445  105.818  8066  120.349  98.739  14.096***  [5.22] 
Secured (dummy)  960  0.548  0.498  4306  0.481  0.500  0.066***  [3.73] 
Performance pricing (dummy)  1653  0.528  0.499  8066  0.503  0.500  0.025*  [1.87] 
General covenant (dummy)  1653  0.632  0.482  8066  0.584  0.493  0.048***  [3.65] 
Financial covenant (dummy)  1653  0.623  0.485  8066  0.601  0.490  0.022*  [1.70] 
Number of lenders  1653  8.902  9.035  8066  10.448  9.658  -1.546***  [5.99] 
Firm characteristics                 
Total assets  1130  7380.939  15623.290  6108  11995.400  39928.390  -4614.465***  [3.83] 
Leverage  1130  0.300  0.192  6108  0.305  0.157  -0.005  [1.04] 
Tangibility  1130  0.635  0.379  6108  0.653  0.390  -0.018  [1.42] 
Profitability  1130  0.146  0.098  6108  0.140  0.086  0.005*  [1.84] 
Market to book  1130  1.888  1.248  6108  1.771  1.107  0.117***  [3.20] 
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Table 3 Board structure and bank loan price  
 
This table presents OLS regression results on the effect of board structure on the price of bank loans. The dependent variable is natural log of spread, which is the all-in 
spread drawn defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down. Independent board is a dummy 
variable which equals one if the majority of the board is independent directors, and zero otherwise. Composition is the fraction of independent directors to total directors 
on the board. Log (outsider) is the natural log of Outsider, which is the total number of independent directors on the board. Large board is a dummy variable which 
equals one if there are over 9 directors on the board and zero otherwise. Log (size) is the natural log of size, which is the total number of directors on the board. Board to 
firm size is the fraction of total number of director on the board to total assets of the firm. Duality is a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is also the chairman 
of the board, and zero otherwise. Log (assets) is the natural log of total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as the long term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
divided by total assets. Tangibility is defined as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided by total 
assets Market to book is defined as the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which equals 
(1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. Log (facility) is the natural log of loan facility amount. Log (maturity) is the natural 
log of loan maturity. Prior relations is the total number of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. Rating is defined as rating 
score from 1 to 6 with one indicating an Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, five indicating a Bb rating, 
and six indicating a B or worse rating. G-index is Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index. Credit spread is the difference between AAA 
corporate bond yield and BAA corporate bond yield. Term spread is the difference between the 10 year treasury yield and the 2 year treasury yield. We also control for 
year effect, one digit SIC code industry effect, loan type effect and loan purpose effect in the regressions, and the results are not reported in the table. Absolute values of 
the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Board characteristics                 
Independent board (dummy)  -0.113***               
  [5.56]               
Composition    -0.304***            -0.304*** 
    [6.59]            [6.58] 
Log(outsider)      -0.196***           
      [9.64]           
Large board (dummy)        -0.106***         
        [6.50]         
Log(size)          -0.244***      -0.246*** 
          [6.85]      [6.94] 
Board to firm size            -0.506***     
            [5.83]     
Duality (dummy)              -0.033  -0.019 
              [1.53]  [0.94] 
Firm characteristics                 
Log(assets)  -0.054***  -0.053***  -0.039***  -0.047***  -0.043***  -0.070***  -0.058***  -0.037*** 
  [7.46]  [7.26]  [5.32]  [6.30]  [5.76]  [9.37]  [7.88]  [4.90] 
Leverage  0.822***  0.814***  0.796***  0.851***  0.850***  0.840***  0.847***  0.812*** 
  [15.96]  [15.75]  [15.57]  [16.66]  [16.74]  [16.30]  [16.51]  [15.91] 
Tangibility  -0.041*  -0.039*  -0.029  -0.042**  -0.042**  -0.047**  -0.050**  -0.031 
  [1.95]  [1.86]  [1.39]  [2.01]  [1.97]  [2.21]  [2.39]  [1.48] 49 
 
Profitability  -0.589***  -0.588***  -0.616***  -0.642***  -0.660***  -0.760***  -0.597***  -0.648*** 
  [4.27]  [4.26]  [4.49]  [4.61]  [4.76]  [5.47]  [4.30]  [4.71] 
Market to book  -0.056***  -0.057***  -0.055***  -0.052***  -0.051***  -0.046***  -0.055***  -0.054*** 
  [5.98]  [6.07]  [5.93]  [5.53]  [5.53]  [4.88]  [5.88]  [5.79] 
Z-score  -0.026**  -0.028**  -0.028***  -0.025**  -0.023**  -0.035***  -0.026**  -0.026** 
  [2.48]  [2.57]  [2.64]  [2.31]  [2.25]  [3.13]  [2.39]  [2.49] 
G-index  -0.012***  -0.011***  -0.007**  -0.013***  -0.012***  -0.015***  -0.014***  -0.007** 
  [4.05]  [3.53]  [2.42]  [4.20]  [3.85]  [5.16]  [4.68]  [2.26] 
Loan characteristics                 
Log(facility)  -0.095***  -0.095***  -0.093***  -0.091***  -0.091***  -0.090***  -0.093***  -0.092*** 
  [11.63]  [11.69]  [11.50]  [11.14]  [11.09]  [11.00]  [11.42]  [11.34] 
Log(maturity)  0.119***  0.118***  0.116***  0.120***  0.120***  0.121***  0.122***  0.116*** 
  [10.86]  [10.74]  [10.58]  [10.95]  [10.96]  [11.03]  [11.05]  [10.57] 
Prior relations  0.008***  0.007***  0.007***  0.008***  0.009***  0.008***  0.008***  0.008*** 
  [4.14]  [3.95]  [3.86]  [4.42]  [4.78]  [4.38]  [4.42]  [4.45] 
Rating  0.288***  0.286***  0.280***  0.286***  0.284***  0.287***  0.289***  0.280*** 
  [35.20]  [35.00]  [34.12]  [35.02]  [34.52]  [35.08]  [35.43]  [34.11] 
Macroeconomic factors                 
Credit spread  0.149***  0.148***  0.139***  0.144***  0.142***  0.149***  0.140***  0.151*** 
  [3.40]  [3.36]  [3.18]  [3.31]  [3.27]  [3.43]  [3.22]  [3.46] 
Term spread  -0.183  -0.183  -0.191*  -0.185  -0.179  -0.169  -0.175  -0.193* 
  [1.59]  [1.58]  [1.66]  [1.60]  [1.56]  [1.47]  [1.52]  [1.67] 
                 
Observations  7237  7237  7237  7237  7237  7237  7237  7237 
Adjusted R2  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.48  0.50 
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Table 4 Audit committee structure, other director characteristics and bank loan price 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results on the effects of board and audit committee characteristics on the price of bank loans. The dependent variable is natural 
log of spread, which is the all-in spread drawn defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down. 
Audit composition is the fraction of independent directors to total directors on the audit committee. Log (audit size) is the natural log of audit size, which is the total 
number of directors on the audit committee. Audit duality a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is also a member of the audit committee, and zero otherwise. 
Audit financial expert is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one of the audit committee member is a financial expert, and zero otherwise. Woman is a dummy 
variable which equals one if at least one of the board member is a female, and zero otherwise. Less attendance is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one 
director in a board who attend less than 75% board meetings in a year, and zero otherwise. Interlock is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director in a 
board is an interlocked director. Diversity is the fraction of minority directors, including African Americans, Asians and Hispanics, to the total directors on the board. 
Board shareholding is the ownership percentage of all directors on the board, as a fraction of shares outstanding. Log (Age) is the natural log of age, which is the 
average age of total directors on the board. Log (Tenure) is the natural log of tenure, which is the average tenure of total directors on the board. Directorship is the 
average number of directorship held by total directors in a board. Blockholder is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director on the board holds more 
than 5% shares of the firm, and zero otherwise. Composition is the fraction of independent directors to total directors on the board. Log (size) is the natural log of size, 
which is the total number of directors on the board. Duality is a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Log 
(assets) is the natural log of total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as the long term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. Tangibility is defined 
as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided by total assets Market to book is defined as the market 
value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 
3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. Log (facility) is the natural log of loan facility amount. Log (maturity) is the natural log of loan maturity. Prior relations is the total 
number of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. Rating is defined as rating score from 1 to 6 with one indicating an Aaa 
rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, five indicating a Bb rating, and six indicating a B or worse rating. G-index 
is Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index. Credit spread is the difference between AAA corporate bond yield and BAA corporate bond yield. 
Term spread is the difference between the 10 year treasury yield and the 2 year treasury yield. We also control for year effect, one digit SIC code industry effect, loan 
type effect and loan purpose effect in the regressions, and the results are not reported in the table. Absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Board characteristics        
Audit composition  -0.195***    -0.123** 
  [3.82]    [2.05] 
Log (audit size)  -0.157***    -0.069* 
  [5.86]    [1.82] 
Audit duality (dummy)  0.021    0.034 
  [0.93]    [1.54] 
Audit financial expert (dummy)  -0.098***    -0.089*** 
  [3.53]    [3.24] 
Woman (dummy)    -0.077***  -0.049** 
    [4.16]  [2.44] 
Less Attendance (dummy)    -0.027  -0.024 
    [1.30]  [1.08] 51 
 
Interlock (dummy)    -0.058**  -0.089*** 
    [2.02]  [2.74] 
Diversity    -0.232***  -0.161*** 
    [8.28]  [5.52] 
Board shareholding    0.161***  0.106* 
    [3.13]  [1.85] 
Log (age)    0.361***  0.600*** 
    [2.69]  [4.11] 
Log (tenure)    -0.115***  -0.143*** 
    [5.63]  [6.70] 
Directorship    0.007**  0.004 
    [2.33]  [1.49] 
Blockholder (dummy)    0.081***  0.078*** 
    [2.88]  [2.78] 
Composition      -0.194*** 
      [2.95] 
Log (size)      -0.211*** 
      [5.04] 
Duality (dummy)      -0.012 
      [0.53] 
Firm characteristics        
Log (assets)  -0.063***  -0.041***  -0.041*** 
  [7.97]  [5.39]  [4.92] 
Leverage  0.809***  0.814***  0.785*** 
  [14.38]  [15.78]  [13.96] 
Tangibility  -0.071***  -0.030  -0.052** 
  [3.10]  [1.44]  [2.28] 
Profitability  -0.707***  -0.689***  -0.806*** 
  [4.78]  [5.09]  [5.57] 
Market to book  -0.069***  -0.050***  -0.064*** 
  [6.47]  [5.43]  [6.08] 
Z-score  -0.030**  -0.021**  -0.023* 
  [2.45]  [2.00]  [1.96] 
G-index  -0.011***  -0.006*  -0.001 
  [3.44]  [1.89]  [0.03] 
Loan characteristics       
Log (facility)  -0.081***  -0.092***  -0.077*** 
  [9.18]  [11.34]  [8.81] 
Log (maturity)  0.117***  0.115***  0.110*** 
  [9.80]  [10.43]  [9.27] 
Prior relations  0.010***  0.008***  0.010*** 
  [5.27]  [4.21]  [5.16] 
Rating  0.297***  0.278***  0.283*** 
  [32.92]  [33.91]  [31.41] 
Macroeconomic factors        52 
 
Credit spread  0.135***  0.130***  0.112** 
  [3.09]  [2.98]  [2.56] 
Term spread  -0.119  -0.177  -0.136 
  [1.02]  [1.56]  [1.18] 
       
Observations  6272  7237  6272 
Adjusted R2  0.51  0.50  0.53 
   53 
 
Table 5 Robustness checks 
 
This table presents robustness checks of the effects of board characteristics on the bank loan price. Column 1 is the OLS regression using reduced sample which 
includes only one largest facility per firm year. Column 2 is the firm and year fixed effect regression. Column 3 is the median regression. Column 4 is the two stage 
least square regression, with asset maturity as the instrument variable to control for the potential endogeneity of debt maturity. The dependent variable is natural log of 
spread, which is the all-in spread drawn defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down. 
Composition is the fraction of independent directors to total directors on the board. Log (size) is the natural log of size, which is the total number of directors on the 
board. Duality is a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Audit composition is the fraction of independent 
directors to total directors on the audit committee. Log (audit size) is the natural log of audit size, which is the total number of directors on the audit committee. Audit 
duality a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is also a member of the audit committee, and zero otherwise. Audit financial expert is a dummy variable which 
equals one if at least one of the audit committee member is a financial expert, and zero otherwise. Woman a dummy variable which equals one if at least one of the 
board member is a female, and zero otherwise. Less attendance is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director in a board who attend less than 75% board 
meetings in a year, and zero otherwise. Interlock is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director in a board is an interlocked director. Diversity is the 
fraction of minority directors, including African Americans, Asians and Hispanics, to the total directors on the board. Board shareholding is the ownership percentage 
of all directors on the board, as a fraction of shares outstanding. Log (Age) is the natural log of age, which is the average age of total directors on the board. Log (Tenure) 
is the natural log of tenure, which is the average tenure of total directors on the board. Directorship is the average number of directorship held by total directors in a 
board. Blockholder is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director on the board holds more than 5% shares of the firm, and zero otherwise. Log (assets) is 
the natural log of total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as the long term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. Tangibility is defined as the net 
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided by total assets Market to book is defined as the market value of 
equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT 
+ 0.999Sales) /Total assets. Log (facility) is the natural log of loan facility amount. Log (maturity) is the natural log of loan maturity. Prior relations is the total number 
of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. Rating is defined as rating score from 1 to 6 with one indicating an Aaa rating, two 
indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, five indicating a Bb rating, and six indicating a B or worse rating. Rating information 
is obtained from Moody’s senior debt ratings at the close of the loan in Dealscan. If it is missing, we rely on the S&P rating. G-index is Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) corporate governance index. Credit spread is the difference between AAA corporate bond yield and BAA corporate bond yield. Term spread is the difference 
between the 10 year treasury yield and the 2 year treasury yield. We also control for year effect, one digit SIC code industry effect, loan type effect and loan purpose 
effect in the regressions, and the results are not reported in the table. Absolute values of the z-statistics and the t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  One facility 
per firm-year 
Firm and year 
fixed effect regression  Median regression  Two stage least square regression 
(instrument for loan maturity) 
Board characteristics         
Composition  -0.190**  -0.175**  -0.225***  -0.196*** 
  [2.31]  [2.29]  [2.74]  [2.98] 
Log (size)  -0.138**  -0.188***  -0.156***  -0.216*** 
  [2.40]  [3.74]  [3.07]  [5.28] 
Duality (dummy)  -0.009  -0.012  0.016  -0.012 
  [0.32]  [0.50]  [0.57]  [0.55] 
Audit composition  -0.154*  -0.139**  -0.091*  -0.113** 
  [1.94]  [2.03]  [1.84]  [2.03] 54 
 
Log (audit size)  -0.070*  -0.077**  -0.066*  -0.068* 
  [1.71]  [2.34]  [1.78]  [1.80] 
Audit duality (dummy)  0.012  0.035  0.023  0.033 
  [0.41]  [1.37]  [0.84]  [1.52] 
Audit financial expert (dummy)  -0.066*  -0.086***  -0.053*  -0.090*** 
  [1.79]  [2.98]  [1.66]  [3.52] 
Woman (dummy)  -0.036  -0.047**  -0.069***  -0.047** 
  [1.38]  [2.09]  [2.71]  [2.25] 
Less attendance (dummy)  0.005  -0.026  -0.023  -0.024 
  [0.20]  [1.11]  [0.82]  [1.08] 
Interlock (dummy)  -0.084**  -0.089**  -0.092**  -0.096*** 
  [2.15]  [2.33]  [2.37]  [3.08] 
Diversity  -0.173***  -0.169***  -0.156***  -0.160*** 
  [4.62]  [4.93]  [4.30]  [5.46] 
Board shareholding  0.107  0.097  0.070  0.109** 
  [1.43]  [1.27]  [1.04]  [2.02] 
Log (age)  0.500***  0.593***  0.698***  0.607*** 
  [2.64]  [3.52]  [3.78]  [4.10] 
Log (tenure)  -0.157***  -0.144***  -0.128***  -0.140*** 
  [5.69]  [5.69]  [4.78]  [6.52] 
Directorship  0.006*  0.005  0.003  0.004 
  [1.70]  [1.34]  [0.71]  [1.54] 
Blockholder (dummy)  0.100***  0.079***  0.092***  0.076*** 
  [2.68]  [2.71]  [2.80]  [2.86] 
Firm characteristic          
Log (assets)  -0.029***  -0.041***  -0.045***  -0.042*** 
  [2.64]  [4.16]  [4.83]  [5.57] 
Leverage  0.926***  0.775***  0.807***  0.781*** 
  [13.02]  [11.32]  [11.93]  [14.25] 
Tangibility  -0.067**  -0.041  -0.075***  -0.058** 
  [2.25]  [1.52]  [2.60]  [2.45] 
Profitability  -0.800***  -0.819***  -0.844***  -0.808*** 
  [4.43]  [4.78]  [4.89]  [5.73] 
Market to book  -0.064***  -0.065***  -0.079***  -0.064*** 
  [4.80]  [5.26]  [7.37]  [7.30] 
Z-score  -0.021  -0.020  -0.029**  -0.027*** 
  [1.55]  [1.53]  [2.40]  [2.77] 
G-index  -0.006  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  [1.37]  [0.06]  [0.04]  [0.03] 
Loan characteristics          
Log (facility)  -0.118***  -0.075***  -0.076***  -0.078*** 
  [10.24]  [7.90]  [7.75]  [9.82] 
Log (maturity)  0.155***  0.109***  0.101***  0.111*** 
  [9.59]  [8.42]  [7.84]  [10.69] 
Prior relations  0.009***  0.010***  0.009***  0.010*** 55 
 
  [3.23]  [4.87]  [3.67]  [5.07] 
Rating  0.258***  0.284***  0.332***  0.281*** 
  [22.52]  [26.98]  [35.61]  [37.58] 
Macroeconomic factors          
Credit spread  0.139**  0.114***  0.095**  0.109** 
  [2.25]  [2.65]  [1.97]  [2.58] 
Term spread  -0.068  -0.023  -0.058  -0.151 
  [0.42]  [0.20]  [0.38]  [1.25] 
         
Observations  3707  6272  6272  6239 
Adjusted R2  0.57  0.53  0.51  0.53 
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Table 6 SOX and bank loan price 
 
This table presents the regression results of the effect of SOX on the price of bank loans. The dependent variable is natural log of spread, which is the all-in spread 
drawn defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down. SOX is a binary variable which equals 
one if a year is after 2002 and zero if a year is before 2002. Changing firms is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm changes its board structure from an insider-
dominant board to an outside-dominant board. Composition is the fraction of independent directors to total directors on the board. Log (size) is the natural log of size, 
which is the total number of directors on the board. Log (assets) is the natural log of total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as the long term debt plus debt in 
current liabilities divided by total assets. Tangibility is defined as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA 
divided by total assets Market to book is defined as the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-
score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. Log (facility) is the natural log of loan facility amount. Log 
(maturity) is the natural log of loan maturity. Prior relations is the total number of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. 
Rating is defined as rating score from 1 to 6 with one indicating an Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, 
five indicating a Bb rating, and six indicating a B or worse rating. G-index is Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index. Credit spread is the 
difference between AAA corporate bond yield and BAA corporate bond yield. Term spread is the difference between the 10 year treasury yield and the 2 year treasury 
yield. We also control for year effect, one digit SIC code industry effect, loan type effect and loan purpose effect in the regressions, and the results are not reported in 
the table. Absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively.  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  (Full Sample)  (Large Firms)  (Small Firms)  (Difference-in-difference) 
SOX  -0.043*  0.051  -0.131***  -0.010 
  [1.76]  [1.39]  [4.01]  [0.38] 
Changing firms        0.182*** 
        [4.41] 
SOX*Changing firms        -0.264*** 
        [5.17] 
Firm characteristics          
Log (assets)  -0.062***  -0.050***  -0.071***  -0.058*** 
  [6.60]  [2.90]  [3.70]  [6.23] 
Leverage  0.927***  0.576***  1.109***  0.900*** 
  [13.03]  [4.94]  [12.65]  [12.58] 
Tangibility  -0.124***  -0.147***  -0.065*  -0.121*** 
  [4.51]  [3.57]  [1.72]  [4.33] 
Profitability  -0.566***  -0.707**  -0.921***  -0.548*** 
  [2.91]  [2.08]  [3.67]  [2.80] 
Market to book  -0.080***  -0.028  -0.081***  -0.082*** 
  [6.08]  [1.23]  [4.86]  [6.23] 
Z-score  -0.032**  -0.104***  0.006  -0.034** 
  [2.13]  [4.90]  [0.38]  [2.23] 
G-index  -0.016***  -0.010**  -0.023***  -0.015*** 
  [4.29]  [1.99]  [4.37]  [3.88] 
Loan characteristics          57 
 
Log (facility)  -0.099***  -0.116***  -0.069***  -0.101*** 
  [9.23]  [8.05]  [4.22]  [9.41] 
Log (maturity)  0.082***  0.027  0.128***  0.081*** 
  [6.07]  [1.53]  [6.24]  [6.05] 
Prior relations  0.011***  0.011***  0.012***  0.011*** 
  [5.03]  [3.63]  [3.31]  [5.05] 
Rating  0.289***  0.330***  0.235***  0.287*** 
  [27.18]  [19.21]  [16.27]  [27.22] 
Macroeconomic factors         
Credit spread  0.117***  0.073***  0.161***  0.116*** 
  [10.50]  [4.73]  [10.42]  [10.46] 
Term spread  -0.023  0.047  -0.059  -0.027 
  [0.37]  [0.50]  [0.73]  [0.44] 
         
Observations  4416  2207  2209  4416 
Adjusted R2  0.48  0.51  0.36  0.48 
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Table 7 Interaction between board independence and borrower characteristics and bank loan price 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the effects of interaction between board independence and different borrower characteristics on the price of bank loans. 
The dependent variable is natural log of spread, which is the all-in spread drawn defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR 
equivalent for each dollar drawn down. Composition is the fraction of independent directors to total directors on the board. High-leverage is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the firm’s leverage level is above median values of leverage in the full sample. High-tangibility is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm’s 
tangibility level is above median values of tangibility in the full sample. High-G-index is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm’s G-index score is above 
median values of G-index in the full sample. Log (assets) is the natural log of total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as the long term debt plus debt in current 
liabilities divided by total assets. Tangibility is defined as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided 
by total assets Market to book is defined as the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score 
which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. Log (facility) is the natural log of loan facility amount. Log (maturity) is 
the natural log of loan maturity. Prior relations is the total number of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. Rating is 
defined as rating score from 1 to 6 with one indicating an Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, five 
indicating a Bb rating, and six indicating a B or worse rating. G-index is Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index. Credit spread is the difference 
between AAA corporate bond yield and BAA corporate bond yield. Term spread is the difference between the 10 year treasury yield and the 2 year treasury yield. We 
also control for year effect, one digit SIC code industry effect, loan type effect and loan purpose effect in the regressions, and the results are not reported in the table. 
Absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Composition  -0.237***  -0.435***  -0.428*** 
  [3.40]  [7.29]  [8.13] 
High-leverage  0.298***     
  [4.86]     
High-leverage*Composition  -0.196**     
  [2.29]     
High-tangibility    -0.222***   
    [3.73]   
High-tangibility*Composition  0.288***   
    [3.47]   
High-G-index      -0.310*** 
      [4.64] 
High-G-index*Composition      0.368*** 
      [4.01] 
Firm characteristics        
Log (assets)  -0.049***  -0.053***  -0.050*** 
  [6.55]  [7.30]  [6.94] 
Leverage    0.820***  0.807*** 
    [15.91]  [15.56] 
Tangibility  -0.045**    -0.040* 
  [2.10]    [1.91] 
Profitability  -0.252*  -0.617***  -0.599*** 
  [1.83]  [4.66]  [4.36] 59 
 
Market to book  -0.072***  -0.056***  -0.056*** 
  [7.33]  [6.05]  [5.96] 
Z-score  -0.058***  -0.025**  -0.027** 
  [5.04]  [2.45]  [2.49] 
G-index  -0.011***  -0.011***   
  [3.46]  [3.52]   
Loan characteristics        
Log (facility)  -0.095***  -0.094***  -0.095*** 
  [11.67]  [11.67]  [11.73] 
Log (maturity)  0.123***  0.118***  0.119*** 
  [11.09]  [10.77]  [10.83] 
Prior relations  0.008***  0.008***  0.008*** 
  [4.12]  [4.22]  [4.51] 
Rating  0.288***  0.286***  0.287*** 
  [34.71]  [35.13]  [35.23] 
Macroeconomic factors       
Credit spread  0.164***  0.153***  0.149*** 
  [3.69]  [3.49]  [3.38] 
Term spread  -0.176  -0.177  -0.189 
  [1.51]  [1.53]  [1.63] 
       
Observations  7237  7237  7237 
Adjusted R2  0.48  0.49  0.49 
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Table 8 Interaction between board independence and loan characteristics and bank loan spread 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the effects of interaction between board independence and different loan characteristics on the price of bank loans. The 
dependent variable is natural log of spread, which is the all-in spread drawn defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent 
for each dollar drawn down. Composition is the fraction of independent directors to total directors on the board. Term-loan is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
type of the loan is the term loan, and zero otherwise. Sole-loan is a dummy variable which equals one if there is only one lender in a single loan, and zero otherwise. 
Log (assets) is the natural log of total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as the long term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. Tangibility is 
defined as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided by total assets Market to book is defined as the 
market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained 
earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. Log (facility) is the natural log of loan facility amount. Log (maturity) is the natural log of loan maturity. Prior relations 
is the total number of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. Rating is defined as rating score from 1 to 6 with one indicating 
an Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, five indicating a Bb rating, and six indicating a B or worse rating. 
G-index is Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index. Credit spread is the difference between AAA corporate bond yield and BAA corporate 
bond yield. Term spread is the difference between the 10 year treasury yield and the 2 year treasury yield. We also control for year effect, one digit SIC code industry 
effect, loan type effect and loan purpose effect in the regressions, and the results are not reported in the table. Absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Composition  -0.295***  -0.327*** 
  [6.14]  [6.84] 
Term-loan  0.362***   
  [5.26]   
Term-loan*Composition  0.174*   
  [1.72]   
Sole-loan    -0.133 
    [1.39] 
Sole-loan*Composition    0.253* 
    [1.79] 
Firm characteristics      
Log (assets)  -0.059***  -0.053*** 
  [8.28]  [8.43] 
Leverage  0.700***  0.811*** 
  [13.96]  [15.91] 
Tangibility  -0.026  -0.040* 
  [1.34]  [1.83] 
Profitability  -0.564***  -0.582*** 
  [4.33]  [4.51] 
Market to book  -0.060***  -0.057*** 
  [6.43]  [7.21] 
Z-score  -0.029***  -0.028*** 
  [3.18]  [3.09] 
G-index  -0.009***  -0.011*** 61 
 
  [2.98]  [3.46] 
Loan characteristics      
Log (facility)  -0.078***  -0.093*** 
  [9.95]  [12.23] 
Log (maturity)  0.073***  0.119*** 
  [6.79]  [12.08] 
Prior relations  0.006***  0.007*** 
  [3.46]  [4.34] 
Rating  0.274***  0.286*** 
  [34.65]  [41.28] 
Macroeconomic factors     
Credit spread  0.119***  0.148*** 
  [2.91]  [3.50] 
Term spread  -0.197*  -0.181 
  [1.74]  [1.49] 
     
Observations  7237  7237 
Adjusted R2  0.52  0.49 
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Table 9 Board characteristics, non-price loan terms and loan ownership  
 
This table presents Logit and OLS regression results of the effects of board characteristics on the non-price loan terms and loan ownership. The dependent variables are 
Secured, which is a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is secured by collateral, and zero otherwise, general covenant, which is a dummy variable that equals one 
if there is a general covenant provision in the loan contract, and zero otherwise, Financial covenant, which a dummy variable that equals one if there is a financial 
covenant provision in the loan contract, and zero otherwise, Performance pricing, which is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a performance pricing provision 
in the loan contract, and zero otherwise, and number of lenders, which is the total number of lenders in a single loan. Composition is the fraction of independent 
directors to total directors on the board. Log (size) is the natural log of size, which is the total number of directors on the board. Duality is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Audit composition is the fraction of independent directors to total directors on the audit 
committee. Log (audit size) is the natural log of audit size, which is the total number of directors on the audit committee. Audit duality a dummy variable which equals 
one if the CEO is also a member of the audit committee, and zero otherwise. Audit financial expert is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one of the audit 
committee member is a financial expert, and zero otherwise. Woman is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one of the board member is a female, and zero 
otherwise. Less attendance is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director in a board who attend less than 75% board meetings in a year, and zero 
otherwise. Interlock is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director in a board is an interlocked director. Diversity is the fraction of minority directors, 
including African Americans, Asians and Hispanics, to the total directors on the board. Board shareholding is the ownership percentage of all directors on the board, as 
a fraction of shares outstanding. Log (Age) is the natural log of age, which is the average age of total directors on the board. Log (Tenure) is the natural log of tenure, 
which is the average tenure of total directors on the board. Directorship is the average number of directorship held by total directors in a board. Blockholder is a dummy 
variable which equals one if at least one director on the board holds more than 5% shares of the firm, and zero otherwise. Log (assets) is the natural log of total assets of 
the firm. Leverage is defined as the long term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. Tangibility is defined as the net property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided by total assets Market to book is defined as the market value of equity plus book value of debt 
divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. 
Regulated is a dummy variable which equals one for firms in utility industry (SIC code 4900-4999). R&D is the total R&D expenditure divided by total assets. Analyst 
forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of actual earnings-deflated individual analysts’ earnings forecasts. Log (facility) is the natural log of loan facility amount. 
Log (maturity) is the natural log of loan maturity. Prior relations is the total number of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. 
Rating is defined as rating score from 1 to 6 with one indicating an Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, 
five indicating a Bb rating, and six indicating a B or worse rating. Loan concentration is the loan amount divided by total debt. Syndication is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the number of lenders in a loan is more than one. We also control for year effect, one digit SIC code industry effect, loan type effect and loan purpose 
effect in the regressions, and the results are not reported in the table. Absolute values of the z-statistics and the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 










pricing (dummy )  Log (Lenders) 
Board characteristics           
Composition  -0.805**  -1.278***  -0.832***  -1.785***  0.193** 
  [2.06]  [4.76]  [3.26]  [6.77]  [2.28] 
Log (size)  -0.283  -0.310*  -0.172  -0.341**  0.050 
  [1.21]  [1.79]  [1.10]  [2.13]  [0.95] 
Duality (dummy)  0.055  -0.111  -0.049  0.082  0.026 
  [0.44]  [1.19]  [0.56]  [0.98]  [0.93] 
Audit composition  -0.882***  -0.715***  -0.419*  -0.592***  -0.037 63 
 
  [2.66]  [3.16]  [1.78]  [2.67]  [0.50] 
Log (audit size)  -0.164  0.152  -0.016  -0.041  0.020 
  [0.94]  [1.26]  [0.14]  [0.36]  [0.52] 
Audit duality (dummy)  -0.156  -0.115  -0.131  -0.146  0.003 
  [1.39]  [1.12]  [1.55]  [1.58]  [0.10] 
Audit financial expert (dummy)  -0.362**  -0.109  -0.141  -0.012  0.071* 
  [2.19]  [1.12]  [1.46]  [0.12]  [1.96] 
Woman (dummy)  -0.094  0.048  -0.073  -0.027  0.055** 
  [0.80]  [0.56]  [0.89]  [0.34]  [2.03] 
Less attendance (dummy)  0.090  0.118  0.097  -0.028  0.004 
  [0.66]  [1.40]  [1.16]  [0.33]  [0.15] 
Interlock (dummy)  -0.066  -0.342***  -0.209*  -0.332***  0.069* 
  [0.29]  [2.94]  [1.80]  [2.73]  [1.67] 
Diversity  -0.529***  -0.073  -0.12  -0.017  0.072* 
  [3.09]  [0.60]  [1.04]  [0.15]  [1.92] 
Board shareholding  0.261  0.088  0.022  0.073  0.096 
  [0.82]  [0.38]  [0.10]  [0.35]  [1.34] 
Log (age)  1.098  0.001  0.082  -0.594  -0.101 
  [1.32]  [0.00]  [0.14]  [1.04]  [0.53] 
Log (tenure)  -0.353***  -0.024  -0.057  -0.040  -0.056** 
  [2.90]  [0.26]  [0.69]  [0.47]  [2.03] 
Directorship  -0.029*  0.006  0.016  0.001  0.003 
  [1.75]  [0.52]  [1.45]  [0.05]  [0.78] 
Blockholder (dummy)  0.288  -0.024  0.041  0.209**  0.052 
  [1.64]  [0.23]  [0.41]  [2.07]  [1.47] 
Firm characteristics           
Log (assets)  -0.006  -0.363***  -0.287***  -0.257***  -0.027*** 
  [0.11]  [7.18]  [8.41]  [8.63]  [2.86] 
Leverage  2.572***  -0.299  -0.310  0.030  0.039 
  [7.35]  [1.19]  [1.35]  [0.15]  [0.54] 
Tangibility  -0.052  -0.147  -0.245***  -0.099  -0.080*** 
  [0.36]  [1.57]  [2.69]  [1.06]  [2.76] 
Profitability  -2.567***  -1.021  -0.654  0.718  0.274* 
  [2.81]  [1.22]  [1.03]  [1.34]  [1.65] 
Market to book  -0.085  -0.290***  -0.195***  -0.024  -0.004 
  [1.29]  [4.67]  [4.33]  [0.75]  [0.38] 
Z-score  -0.087  -0.333***  -0.267***  -0.020  0.032*** 
  [1.21]  [3.98]  [4.81]  [0.56]  [2.95] 
G-index  -0.034*  0.040***  0.054***  0.033**  0.016*** 
  [1.65]  [2.87]  [4.05]  [2.45]  [3.59] 
Regulated  -0.476**         
  [2.03]         
R&D    -2.720***  -1.181***     
    [6.62]  [7.79]     
Analyst forecast dispersion        0.402***   64 
 
        [5.53]   
Loan characteristics           
Log (facility)  -0.193***  0.373***  0.335***  0.263***  0.370*** 
  [3.39]  [10.85]  [10.28]  [8.03]  [33.20] 
Log (maturity)  0.458***  0.096**  0.044  0.128***  0.156*** 
  [6.41]  [2.36]  [1.12]  [3.24]  [10.97] 
Prior relations  0.046***  -0.019***  -0.031***  -0.023***  0.020*** 
  [4.08]  [2.58]  [4.22]  [2.85]  [6.95] 
Rating  1.052***  0.078**  0.122***  0.007  -0.038*** 
  [18.32]  [2.41]  [4.13]  [0.24]  [3.82] 
Loan concentration  0.043*         
  [1.93]         
Syndication (dummy)        0.504***   
        [3.89]   
           
Observations  3334  6256  6256  6272  6272 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2  0.30  0.22  0.11  0.18  0.30 
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Table 10 Two-stage estimation of the structural model  
 
This table presents simultaneous equation estimation of loan price, collateral, covenant and performance pricing. The dependent variable is natural log of spread, which 
is the all-in spread drawn defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down, Secured, which is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a loan is secured by collateral, and zero otherwise, general covenant, which is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a general 
covenant provision in the loan contract, and zero otherwise, Financial covenant, which a dummy variable that equals one if there is a financial covenant provision in the 
loan contract, and zero otherwise, Performance pricing, which is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a performance pricing provision in the loan contract, and 
zero otherwise, and number of lenders, which is the total number of lenders in a single loan. Composition is the fraction of independent directors to total directors on the 
board. Log (size) is the natural log of size, which is the total number of directors on the board. Duality is a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Audit composition is the fraction of independent directors to total directors on the audit committee. Log (audit size) is the 
natural log of audit size, which is the total number of directors on the audit committee. Audit duality a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is also a member of 
the audit committee, and zero otherwise. Audit financial expert is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one of the audit committee member is a financial expert, 
and zero otherwise. Woman is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one of the board member is a female, and zero otherwise. Less attendance is a dummy 
variable which equals one if at least one director in a board who attend less than 75% board meetings in a year, and zero otherwise. Interlock is a dummy variable which 
equals one if at least one director in a board is an interlocked director. Diversity is the fraction of minority directors, including African Americans, Asians and Hispanics, 
to the total directors on the board. Board shareholding is the ownership percentage of all directors on the board, as a fraction of shares outstanding. Log (Age) is the 
natural log of age, which is the average age of total directors on the board. Log (Tenure) is the natural log of tenure, which is the average tenure of total directors on the 
board. Directorship is the average number of directorship held by total directors in a board. Blockholder is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director on 
the board holds more than 5% shares of the firm, and zero otherwise. Log (assets) is the natural log of total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as the long term debt 
plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. Tangibility is defined as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the 
EBITDA divided by total assets Market to book is defined as the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s 
(1968) Z-score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. Regulated is a dummy variable which equals one for 
firms in utility industry (SIC code 4900-4999). R&D is the total R&D expenditure divided by total assets. Analyst forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of actual 
earnings-deflated individual analysts’ earnings forecasts. Log (facility) is the natural log of loan facility amount. Log (maturity) is the natural log of loan maturity. Prior 
relations is the total number of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. Rating is defined as rating score from 1 to 6 with one 
indicating an Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, five indicating a Bb rating, and six indicating a B or 
worse rating. Loan concentration is the loan amount divided by total debt. Syndication is a dummy variable which equals one if the number of lenders in a loan is more 
than one. G-index is Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index. Credit spread is the difference between AAA corporate bond yield and BAA 
corporate bond yield. Term spread is the difference between the 10 year treasury yield and the 2 year treasury yield. We also control for year effect, one digit SIC code 
industry effect, loan type effect and loan purpose effect in the regressions, and the results are not reported in the table. Absolute values of the z-statistics and the 
heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  Log (spread)  Secured (dummy)  Covenant (dummy)  Performance pricing (dummy) 
Fitted spread        -7.959*** 
        [6.17] 
Fitted secured  0.116    -1.546***   
  [1.25]    [4.01]   
Fitted performance pricing  -0.051       
  [0.57]       66 
 
Fitted covenant  0.166***  -0.686***     
  [2.75]  [2.66]     
Board characteristics         
Composition  -0.147**  -1.076***  -1.517***  -3.208*** 
  [1.97]  [2.81]  [5.48]  [9.22] 
Log (size)  -0.187***  -0.325  -0.380**  -1.894*** 
  [4.34]  [1.40]  [2.18]  [6.31] 
Duality (dummy)  -0.010  0.035  -0.109  -0.010 
  [0.43]  [0.28]  [1.17]  [0.12] 
Audit composition  -0.116**  -0.781**  -0.529**  -0.473* 
  [1.98]  [2.40]  [2.31]  [1.68] 
Log (audit size)  -0.069**  -0.091  0.085  -0.638*** 
  [2.22]  [0.54]  [0.70]  [4.27] 
Audit duality (dummy)  0.039*  -0.210  -0.137  -0.021 
  [1.73]  [1.57]  [1.48]  [0.21] 
Audit financial expert (dummy)  -0.071**  -0.420***  -0.178*  -0.686*** 
  [2.53]  [3.08]  [1.80]  [4.65] 
Woman (dummy)  -0.043**  -0.104  0.009  -0.418*** 
  [2.12]  [0.88]  [0.10]  [4.10] 
Less attendance (dummy)  -0.032  0.132  0.134  -0.220** 
  [1.44]  [1.01]  [1.59]  [2.41] 
Interlock (dummy)  -0.079**  -0.121  -0.359***  -1.053*** 
  [2.38]  [0.52]  [3.08]  [6.19] 
Diversity  -0.145***  -0.501***  -0.205  -1.298*** 
  [4.78]  [3.01]  [1.63]  [5.50] 
Board shareholding  0.088  0.273  0.188  0.848*** 
  [1.51]  [0.86]  [0.81]  [3.45] 
Log (age)  0.564***  0.875  0.159  4.293*** 
  [3.86]  [1.06]  [0.26]  [4.40] 
Log (tenure)  -0.132***  -0.322***  -0.101  -1.171*** 
  [6.10]  [2.67]  [1.09]  [5.84] 
Directorship  0.004  -0.025  -0.002  0.035*** 
  [1.45]  [1.56]  [0.15]  [2.73] 
Blockholder (dummy)  0.075***  0.272**  0.026  0.827*** 
  [2.66]  [2.04]  [0.25]  [5.80] 
Firm characteristics         
Log (assets)  -0.033***  -0.059  -0.366***  -0.589*** 
  [3.36]  [1.05]  [7.20]  [9.57] 
Leverage  0.715***  2.743***  0.233  6.274*** 
  [11.32]  [7.92]  [0.87]  [6.07] 
Tangibility  -0.047**  -0.068  -0.147  -0.508*** 
  [2.08]  [0.47]  [1.57]  [4.37] 
Profitability  -0.785***  -2.610***  -1.822**  -5.618*** 
  [5.08]  [2.82]  [2.02]  [4.86] 
Market to book  -0.064***  -0.089  -0.292***  -0.532*** 67 
 
  [6.20]  [1.31]  [4.52]  [6.02] 
Z-score  -0.019*  -0.118  -0.346***  -0.201*** 
  [1.79]  [1.59]  [4.11]  [4.22] 
G-index  -0.001  -0.026  0.029**  0.032** 
  [0.18]  [1.26]  [2.02]  [2.33] 
Regulated    -0.506**     
    [2.18]     
R&D      -2.458***   
      [6.55]   
Analyst forecast dispersion        0.399*** 
        [5.56] 
Loan characteristics         
Log (facility)  -0.082***  -0.164***  0.330***  -0.344*** 
  [7.46]  [2.77]  [9.37]  [3.33] 
Fitted maturity  0.096***  0.416***  0.209***  1.001*** 
  [6.93]  [6.10]  [4.17]  [6.81] 
Prior relations  0.009***  0.040***  -0.008  0.056*** 
  [4.38]  [3.59]  [1.05]  [3.71] 
Rating  0.263***  1.039***  0.334***  2.252*** 
  [14.45]  [18.72]  [4.76]  [6.18] 
Loan concentration    0.044*     
    [1.93]     
Syndication (dummy)        0.490*** 
        [3.77] 
Credit spread  0.097**       
  [2.22]       
Term spread  -0.054       
  [0.46]       
         
Observations  6230  3340  6230  6272 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2  0.52  0.30  0.22  0.18 
 
 